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The right of public access shall now, according to a decision of the
Board of the Municipality, also apply to the local computer file. In
view of this, the computer terminal of the municipality (in the cellar of the Municipality Centre) will be exhibited to the public each
Saturday between noon and one p.m. The current will be turned off
so that there will be no risk that unauthorized persons can look into
the system.
Gronkopings Veckoblad (The Gronkoping Weekly, a satirical Swedish journal published monthly), October 1980.

I. INTRODUCTION
The right of access to documents that concern state and municipal administration and the administration of justice is known in
Sweden as "the right of access to official documents" or, simply,
"the principle of publicity."' In a comparative international perspective it may be said that the openness of recorded official information
under Swedish law is unusually far-reaching. Above all, what distinguishes the principle is its long history: it was first recognized in the
Freedom of the Press Act of 1766. Since then, the principle has been
upheld except for a period of about four decades beginning in 1772
which was marked by royal supremacy.
Over the years the principle has been the target of criticism,
and different views have been advanced on the proper balance to be
struck between openness and secrecy. Public authorities have expressed their opposition to the principle. There are also problems of
costs associated with the implementation of the right of access.
Nevertheless, the right of access to official documents is today regarded as an indispensable element of the Swedish legal system
and of the political life of the country. Swedes tend to have difficulty in understanding that other countries often apply the reverse
1. An overview of the right of access to official documents under Swedish law
may be found in ADmmsTRATrVE SECRECY iN DEVELOPED COUNTRIUES (D. Rowat ed.
1979). See the report on Sweden by Sigvard Holstad at 29-50.
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principle, i.e., a principle of discretionary secrecy. They find it quite
natural that many countries, such as Denmark, Norway, and the
United States, have moved or are now moving in the direction of
broader, legally enforceable rights of access.
This trend toward openness creates new opportunities for comparative studies of the structure and effects of different national
laws on the right of access. 2 No such effort, however, will be made
in this Article. Its scope is limited to the Swedish situation, but it is
my hope that the survey will still be of interest to an international
audience in that it will describe a fairly advanced national legal situation and shed some light on the global problems of openness in
computer systems used by public bodies.
For most of its existence the right of access to official documents or, simply, the right of access, has been applied in a static information environment in which written and printed documents
carry the information. During recent decades, however, the introduction of automatic data processing has brought about considerable changes and a corresponding need for new concepts. At the
early stage the uses of computers in public administration, courts,
and so forth were uncomplicated: they involved maintenance of files
of a simple structure, usually stored on magnetic tapes, which were
processed for a few well-defined and permanent purposes. 3 For instance, each county maintained population files storing information
such as name, age, address, income, weapon licenses, and church
membership. Files of this kind were used to produce printed listings, index cards, and various kinds of printed notifications. Even
for the
computer applications of this simple type caused difficulties
4
application of the traditional rules on the right of access.
The continuing development of computer technology and its applications have further emphasized the need for adjustments and rethinking. Large databases of a complex nature which can be used
for planning, information retrieval, and decision-making in sundry
activities give rise to new difficulties that are not always easy to deal
with. To keep pace with such developments, the basic provisions on
the right of access in Swedish legislation have recently been
amended twice. These amendments became effective on July 1, 1974
and on January 1, 1978, respectively.5 In the autumn of 1980, a public
2. Cf. ADMINISTRATIVE

SECRECY IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES,

supra note 1, at 1-26.

See also CIVIL SERVICE DEP'T, DISCLOSURE OF OFFICIAL INFORMATION, A REPORT ON
OVERSEAS PRACTICE. (London: HMSO 1979).
3. See, e.g., Aron, Information Systems in Perspective, 1 COMPUTING SURVEYS 213

(1969); J. MARTIN, COMPUTER DATA-BASE ORGANIZATION (1977).
4. SOU 1966:60, Offentlighet och sekretess, at 113.
5. Government Bills 1973:33 and 1975/76:160.

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. In

committee proposed a new statute which is intended to complement
the existing basic rules and to clarify the right of access to public
6
computer systems.
One computer application of particular interest in the present
framework involves exchange of messages and organization of
"meetings" via geographically dispersed computer terminals. Systems of this type have been given different names depending upon
the interest that is taken in them and their main orientation. Such
names include teleconferences, computer-assisted text communication, electronic message systems, and electronic mail.7 The term
"teledoc" shall be used as a general term to refer to all such systems. The term is intended to remind one of words such as "telephone," "telegraph," and "teleprinter." The morpheme "tele" means
that something takes place over distance, and the morpheme
"doc" is intended to stand for "dialogue and conference" and for
"documentation." The term, thus, refers to some important charac-teristics of this particular usage of computer networks.
Teledoc systems will probably become an important and widespread tool in administrative activities of various kinds. One existing international teledoc system handles about 25 million
messages per year.8 The technology to support fully operational
teledoc systems is available today at a reasonable cost and will most
likely be improved and refined to meet different needs and requirements. The obstacles to its further development and acceptance are
varied. Some of them pertain to attitudes and work habits, others to
organizational and legal matters.
Several important legal issues of teledoc systems have recently
been illuminated by a project carried out at the Swedish National
Defense Research Institute (FOA).9 The teledoc system of the FOA,
the so-called KOM system (originally KOM 79, presently KOM 81),10
6. SOU 1980:31, Offentlighetsprincipen och ADB.
7. A general treatise of various types of information exchange within groups
whose members may be separated by both space and time may be found in R. JoHANSEN, J. VALLEE & K. SPANGLER, EIEcTROmc MEETINGS (1979).
8. Panks, The EMS Revolution, 34 Computerworld 14 (1980).
9. I am grateful to Messrs. Jacob Palme and Ake Lindwall of the Swedish National Defense Research Institute for providing me with valuable information on the
KOM system and its uses. A detailed documentation of the system has recently
(March 1981) become available in connection with the FOA's application to the Data

Inspection Board for a prolonger license. See, e.g., FOA rapport C 10166-M6(M9),
Erfarenheter av anvandning av telekonferenssystemet KOM by Jacob Palme et al.
Reports in English on the KOM system can be obtained from the FOA. A general
description is found in the COM Computerized Teleconferencing System by Jacob
Palme. Technical information can be found in FOA report No. C 10129E.
10. The original version of the system was named "KOM 79." This system can,
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was the first operational teledoc system in Sweden--or at least the
first system that came to public knowledge and obtained a license
from the Data Inspection Board. Such a license or permit is a prerequisite for the use of systems of this kind. 1 The license granted
to the FOA in January 1979, was valid until March 30, 1981. Similar
licenses have also been granted to the computer center of the University of Stockholm and to the University of Linkoping. In March
1981, the FOA's license was extended for an indefinite period.
In late 1979, three persons asked to be given access to KOM 79
under the Freedom of the Press Act (FPA). The requesters in particular wanted to study messages that concerned a certain matter,
but they also sought access to the entire system with the exception
of secret materials. (The role of secrecy will be discussed later.)
Moreover, the requesters wanted to use one of the terminals without any interference or supervision by the officials of the Authority.
The request was refused. One of the reasons given by the FOA was
that the data in the system could not be regarded as "official documents" which are covered by the right of access. The refusal was
appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeals of Stockholm that
held that the data in KOM 79 could not be withheld from the public.
The court, however, decided against the appellants in regard to their
request to perform uncontrolled searches of the database from a terminal. 12 The Supreme Administrative Courts affirmed this holding
on September 24, 1980.13
The teledoc system KOM and the case just referred to illustrate
some basic problems of the right of access to computerized data.
Many of the details of these problems will be treated later but, to
begin with, a brief introduction must be given to the Swedish legislation on the right of access to official documents and the complementing legislation on official secrecy. In particular, attention shall
be devoted to those parts of the legislation that concern automatic
data processing.
according to a decision of the Data Inspection Board in March 1981 (DN:4203-80), be
used until October 1, 1981. The new version, "KOM 81" or simply "KOM," was at the
same time accepted by the Board. Much of this article deals with KOM 79. The different names, KOM 79 and KOM 81, will be used to distinguish between the original
and the modified system.

11. PER-GUNNAR VINGE, FEDERATION OF SWEDISH INDUSTRIES, EXPERIENCES OF THE
SWEDISH DATA AcT 13 (1975).
12. The Administrative Court of Appeals in Stockholm: Judgment, July 4, 1980,
661-1980.
13. RA 1980 2:42.
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THE AIMS AND SCOPE OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS

The basic rules governing the right of access to official documents are part of the Swedish Constitution and are contained in
Chapter 2 of the FPA. The present statute was enacted in 1949.14
Historically, the right of access was regarded as an accessory or a
complement to the right to reproduce official documents in print and
thus is an integral part of the freedom of the press. This point of
view is still important, but the right of access has gradually gained
independence and now fulfills purposes of its own that tend to place
the original purpose in the background.
The legislative history of the rules on the right of access shows
that the lawmakers made certain arguments and stated certain aims
that are now firmly established. 15 An illustrative example may be
found in a report issued in 1966 by the so-called Publicity
16
Committee.
First, the Committee found that the right of access helps to create an efficient "government by the people" since the public can easily obtain information about the activities of state and local
government organs. Second, control of decision-making and other
activities of public bodies is facilitated. On the one hand, this creates greater confidence in the authorities since they carry out their
activities in the open, and, on the other hand, the rule of law is safeguarded. Third, the right of access contributes to the efficiency of
public administration. Decisions, methods, and means can be discussed with full knowledge of relevant documents. It may be mentioned that the organization and the forms of work of Swedish
public authorities are important in this respect. Written documents
play an essential role in government affairs, and the independence
of the boards and agencies in relation to the ministries is also significant to the extent that documents become official. Fourth, the Publicity Committee gave attention to the value of the right of access for
commercial and related activities in society. According to the committee, duplication of work may be avoided by allowing access to
source materials and reports prepared by public authorities. The
commercial benefits of the right of access, however, are more uncertain and disputed than the other effects. The successor of the Publicity Committee, the Committee on Publicity and Secrecy, which
was set up in 1969, concluded that the right of access may result in
commercial uses of interesting and valuable information. According
14. SFS 1949:105. (complete revised version in SFS 1979:936).
15. Cf. M. HEDBERG, Offentlighotsprincipen och ADB, ADBJ-rapport 1980, at 12-19,

102-112.
16. SOU 1966:60, Offentlighet och sekretess, at 71-74.

19821

TELEDOC AND OPEN RECORDS

to the Committee, however, this consequence of the right of access
but rather as a side
should not be taken as an independent purpose
17
effect that may not always be desirable.
In all legal systems in which it exists, the right of access to official documents is a complex phenomenon; it must be evaluated and
understood in light of other related and interacting rules.' 8 For example, in Sweden, there are rules concerning indexes of adopted
and concluded matters, filing of documents, archives, and similar
matters. These rules have obvious effects for the scope of the right
of access and the burden that is placed on those who seek information. There is a lack of coordination between these rules, which are
distributed in several statutes and ordinances, and the rules in the
FPA. There are also rules concerning open proceedings and meetings, and the rights of parties with a direct interest in a matter to
obtain judgments, decisions, and related documents. Swedish law
provides for such rights of a secondary or complementary nature in
relation to the general right of access. There is also statutory support for the principle that documents should be communicated to
persons who may be affected by them. Finally, there are certain obligations of public bodies, i.e., courts and public authorities, to provide information and advice in general. Swedish law does not
impose absolute duties in this respect since the basic principle is
that information regarding the contents of documents and the activities carried out shall be provided to the extent that it is expedient.
Information services to the public are beginning to attract more attention. As a result, the Data Legislation Committee recently suggested further study on the relationship between the passive right
of access and the creation of active systems for information
dissemination.' 9
The right of access cannot be without limits. There are various
opposing interests that offer reasons for exemptions and modifications. To begin with, there are legitimate needs for secrecy. Section
2:2 of the FPA exhaustively enumerates those needs that are recognized by the constitution. The list contains no elements of an unfair
or surprising nature and is similar to corresponding enumerations in
other national laws. Among the permitted restrictions on the right
of access are those that are necessary to ensure the security of the
state or to protect its relations with other states or international organizations, those that concern the state's central financial, mone17. SOU 1972:47, Data och integritet, at 49-50.
18. See generally ADMImTRATrvE SECRECY IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIEs,
1.

19. SOU 1980:31, Offentlighet och sekretess, at 115.

Mupra

note
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tary or currency policy, those that involve activities to prevent or
suppress crime, and those that protect personal or economic information of an individual. The list contains seven categories of protected interests.
The detailed secrecy rules are set forth in the Secrecy Act of
1980 which became effective on January 1, 1981. The previous Secrecy Act was signed into law in 1937. The Secrecy Act is a complex
piece of legislation. Each chapter deals with a particular group of
protected interests corresponding to one of the categories in section
2:2 of the FPA. Some of the provisions of the Secrecy Act refer to
more detailed regulation in special statutes. Furthermore, the Government may issue prescriptions concerning the application of particular provisions. 20 Generally, the rules on secrecy in the Secrecy
Act should be viewed as exceptions from the main principle of public access. Consequently, they should be applied restrictively so
that an official document may not be kept secret unless there is an
express provision to that effect.
Public authorities require "peace and quiet" to perform their
work; therefore, release of preparatory documents and drafts can be
premature and can interfere with the planning of work. The need
here is for "secrecy of internal matters." Interests of this kind can
be protected by not permitting access to documents that are regarded as unfinished or incomplete. They may, of course, be released if an authority considers openness motivated and welladvised. This area constitutes a gray zone in which disputes often
occur and in which the authorities may interpret and apply the rules
on the right of access in a favorable manner from the point of view
of the information seekers. Under Swedish law part of the problem
concerns the dividing line between the area where the right of access is guaranteed and the area where information services are provided by the authorities only to the extent that it is expedient.
Surprisingly, although the right of access to official documents
is well established in the Swedish legal system, relatively little is
known about its practical value and application. It is often accepted
as a fact that access through representatives is more important than
access obtained by individuals on their own behalf. The most important representatives are the mass media, and, therefore, it is not
uncommon for journalists to look through the incoming mail of ministers and other authorities. Private persons can hardly go to such
trouble since the right of access places heavy burdens on those
seeking information. For instance, private individuals must take an
active interest in public affairs, they must have the time to spend in
20. Sekretessforordning (1980:657).
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acquiring this information, and they must know how to approach.
public authorities and how to identify documents and records that
are of interest.
Conversely, the right of access also involves demands on the
holders of information. The officials who handle matters regarding
access must be familiar with the relevant rules and their application. They must also accept the purposes of the legislation on the
right of access and do their best to fulfill them. In this respect deficiencies are evident. Individual officials are not always as familiar
with the legislation as would be desirable. It is not uncommon for
public authorities to exaggerate the need for secrecy and to shield
their activities from outside inspection and curiosity. Sometimes
care is taken not to include sensitive information in official documents: matters can be kept unfinished, oral communication can be
relied upon, messages can be regarded as "private," and so forth.
The benefits of a principle of public access to official documents are
not always apparent-they must be explained and defended each
day. Appeals to the administrative courts and complaints to the
Parliamentary Ombudsmen involving withholding of official documents are quite frequent. 21 It is a matter of choice of perspective
whether one should regard this as a sign of health or a sign of
malady.
The Working Party for EDP and Law of the Stockholm Faculty
of Law has recently completed a study of the particular problems
with the application to automatic data processing of the rules on the
right of access. The study was carried out by Mats Hedberg and has
so far only been documented in Swedish. 22 Hedberg's investigation
was performed as a case study involving surprise visits to various
public authorities who were asked to provide information from their
computerized files and databases. The questions had been prepared
in advance so that authorities would know what to expect and in order to determine beforehand the data that could and should actually
be supplied. The study indicated that computerization may inhibit
openness. Perhaps the best conclusion is that the risks, which have
long since been associated with lack of knowledge about the legislation and self-defensive reactions of authorities, tend to increase
when ordinary documents are replaced by or complemented with
new data media and automated procedures.
Unfortunately, not all responsible officials seem to have sufficient knowledge about the scope, contents, and structure of the EDP
21. See generally cases and decisions cited in H. STR6MBERG, HANDLUNGSOFFEN(Lund: Studentlitteratur 1980).
22. M. HEDBERG, supra note 15.

TLIGHET OCH SEKRETESS.
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systems that are being used by the public authorities in question.
More precisely, many do not know how data are structured and how
they can be accessed. Traditionally, the Office of the Registrar has
played an important role in handling documents and deciding on
their availability.23 The expansion of this role or function to cover
computerized activities does not seem to have taken place without
disturbances. There is considerable uncertainty in regard to the
consequences of providing access to computerized data, such as,
risks of violations of secrecy requirements, possible interference
with day-to-day work, and undesired effects on the future of an open
access policy because of additional costs. The combined effect of
these uncertainties is a negative attitude towards the person seeking information. It may also be noted that as a rule computer systems have been built up without any concern for the needs or
consequences of the right of access.
Computerization seems to involve certain risks that the right of
access could be eroded, but it may also be viewed as an instrument
which can be used to strengthen and further develop the principle
of openness. The risks associated with EDP may be considered to
be of a temporary nature and the best way of dealing with them is
through conscious efforts to use the computer itself to provide easier and broader access to public information. Such ideas are beginning to gain ground in the Swedish discussion. The question is
whether it is possible to proceed from the passive right of access
guaranteed by existing rules to active information services that may
involve participation of the citizens in the design and operation of
24
particularly important information systems.
In.

THE PARTICULAR PROBLEMS OF ACCESS TO
COMPUTERIZED DATA

Many difficulties arise when legislation concerning the right of
access is applied in a computer context. Problems concerning definitions and construction of existing statutory provisions exist. In
computer systems, data are stored and processed in a different way
from the way in which it was handled in a manual environment. It
is possible that the most difficult issues are associated with this introduction of new kinds of information structures and new ways of
utilizing data.
In theory, solutions to problems of definitions and construction
of statutes may always be found. Rules may be changed and ad23. Cf. B. WENNERGREN, HANDLAGGNING 42, 44 (Stockholm: Liber Fdrlag 1978).
24. P. SEIPEL, ADB ocH JURIDIK. EN PROBLEMOVERSIKT.
Rapport till
Datasamordningskommitten, Ds Fi 1975:3, at 258-79.
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justed to suit a new technology. Practical experience, however,
should guide the choice and evaluation of proposed solutions. This
leads to something of a dilemma, for it may be evident that existing
rules are less than adequate, and serious problems may result from
rapid introduction of new computer applications such as teledoc
systems in public administration. Nevertheless, it may be necessary
to allow such systems to be used in order to gain experience and
learn more about their legal consequences. This may be part of the
explanation why the original license to operate the teledoc system
of the FOA was of a provisional character.
The report of the Publicity Committee in 1966 contains an interesting and succinct statement of the particular problems of the right
of access in computer systems. 25 Machine-readable data are generally less permanent than data stored on paper. The particular risk is
that data may be erased or changed, even though the data should
have been preserved in order to make the right of access meaningful. Secondly, according to the Committee, data in computer systems are not as easy to scan and understand as data contained in
ordinary documents. Thirdly, requests for information that do not
coincide with the uses that the authorities themselves make of the
data may be costly and the delays considerable, if the information
can be supplied at all. These concerns of the Publicity Committee
in 1966 are still of interest today and their practical importance has
certainly grown.
The Committee on Publicity and Secrecy devoted much of its attention to the protection of personal privacy in the computer framework. Its first report, entitled "Data and Integrity" 26 set forth a
suggestion for a data protection law that later became the Data Act
of 1973. The concern for privacy protection also put its mark on the
Committee's proposals in the area of rights of access to official documents. The Committee considered the threatened invasion of privacy posed by the computer so serious that it wished to restrict
access to all kinds of computer files. Actually, the Committee's proposal meant that the right of access to computer recordings would
be more restricted than the right of access to ordinary documents.
The Committee formulated a basic "principle of equal access" so
that the information-seeking public and the authorities, the data
holders, would have equal access to data in computer systems. The
principle, however, was interpreted in a way that was favorable to
the information holders. A person seeking information only had a
right of access corresponding to that which an authority already
25. SOU 1966:60, Offentlighet och sekretess, at 113-14.
26. SOU 1972:47, Data och integritet.
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had. Furthermore, the right of access only extended to data gathered by the authority to meet the needs of that authority. 27 In the
Committee's final report, the limit to the right of access was defined
by the legal right of the authorities to use data:
OSK [i.e., the Committee] proposes that any authority possessing
computerized information should be legally bound to make it available only if that authority is allowed to use the information for official purposes and naturally provided, also, that it should not be
kept secret. The way to bring about this has been to set up a rule
stating that any EDP-recording should be regarded as an official
document in the care of a specific authority only if the authority itself is allowed to transfer the information to documentary form. Instructions given to an authority may limit, not the technical access
to information but the legal access. OSK feels that the authority
should be put in such a position that it cannot be forced to hand out
information on demand which the28authority according to its instruction may not use in its activities.
Thus, according to the Committee, in order to decide whether
data may be withheld, both the practical possibility of transforming
machine-readable data into documentary form and the legal right of
an authority to withhold the information must be examined. This
suggested version of a principle of equal access was criticized for
leaving too much room for discretionary decisions by the authorities
as to when data should be transferred and for deviating from the
traditional rules on the right of access to ordinary documents. The
Ministry of Justice, in preparing the Government Bill, found that the
committee had gone too far in its ambition to protect personal data
from being used without control.29 The bill, which has now become
the law, suggested a solution that interprets the principle of equal
access in a way that is more favorable to the public.
To summarize, there are at least four circumstances associated
with computer systems that complicate attempts to adjust the traditional rules on the right of access.
(1) Knowledge of existing problems and the effects of various rules
is still incomplete.
(2) New applications of EDP (teledoc systems, for instance) give
rise to new problems.
(3) Integration of different applications of EDP leads to more complex situations and increased demands for sophisticated legal
rules.
27. Id. at 66-67.
28. SOU 1975"22, Lag om almanna handlingar, at 26.

29. Government Bill 1975/76:160, at 85-88.
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Computer processing of data causes new problems with regard
to the safeguarding of secrecy.
IV.

A CLOSER LOOK AT THE RIGHT OF
ACCESS UNDER THE FPA

A. TRADrrIONAL DOCUMENTS
The concept of a document plays a central role in Chapter 2 of
the Freedom of the Press Act. The term covers written presentations of various kinds as well as such items as maps, drawings, and
pictures.
The principle of publicity applies to all documents that are official. An official document is any document that is kept by a state or
municipal authority and that has been either received or drawn up
by the authority. Thus, the one basic requirement is that the document is in the keeping of an authority, and an additional condition is
that the document has been either received or drawn up.
The criterion of "being kept" is satisfied if a document is physically in the possession of an authority. It does not matter whether
the document has temporarily been taken away by one of the officials. According to the main principle, a document is considered to
have been received when it has reached an authority (i.e., arrived at
the premises) or when it has been handed over to a competent official (even if this takes place in a private home, for instance).
The rules on the concept of drawn up are more complicated, and
the FPA distinguishes between different categories of documents.
Documents are considered to be drawn up when they have been dispatched, or when measures have been taken to make them known to
an external party. Documents that are not dispatched but that are
for internal purposes only, are considered to be drawn up when the
matter concerned has been finally settled by the authority. If such
documents do not relate to any particular matter, then they are considered to be drawn up when they have been revised and approved
by the authority.
Special rules apply to certain types of documents. Thus, indexes of matters, journals, files, or other lists that are maintained
continuously are considered to be drawn up when they are ready for
entry or posting. This means that indexes and fies of this sort can
be accessed as soon as they exist as a concept and are prepared to
receive entries; it is not necessary that they contain any.
As was mentioned above, there is a need to exempt drafts, internal notes, tentative working papers and the like. Memoranda, i.e.,
notes that have been put together solely to present a matter or to
prepare it for decision and that have not been dispatched, do not be-
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come official documents in the hands of the authority that prepared
them unless they are filed together with the other documents of the
matter for the purpose of being kept. Notes that contain factual information that is relevant to a matter (e.g., notes on a discussion
30
with the parties to a case), however, should be fied and kept.
Drafts of decisions of an authority, drafts of writings from an authority, and comparable draft documents that have not been dispatched
are not regarded as official documents unless they are fied and kept
for the future. Drafts of this kind may or may not be related to a
particular matter. There are a number of other special provisions
for certain types of documents. Some of them pertain to machinereadable media and will be discussed in a subsequent part of the
survey.
Official documents are, according to the main rule, public in nature, and therefore, should be freely accessible to all Swedish nationals. 31 Exempted documents are listed in the Secrecy Act of 1980,
in related statutes, and in prescriptions of the Government. The Secrecy Act regulates both the release of documents and the obligations of officials not to divulge secret information. It regulates
relationships between the public and the authorities as well as relationships among the authorities themselves. The Secrecy Act often
sets time limits that define the maximum period that a certain type
of document may be kept secret. Earlier release is possible if there
is no risk of damage or abuse. A person concerned may also suspend secrecy that is in his or her exclusive interest. The main principle is that no document should be kept secret unless its release
32
could, on careful consideration, cause a specific damage.
After receiving a request for access, an authority must examine
whether the document at issue is official and whether it is public or
secret. In principle, the authority has no right to investigate either
the identity (including the nationality) of the information seeker or
the reasons for the request. It may, however, be necessary for the
authority to obtain such information in order to be able to evaluate
the risk of abuse or damage according to a specific provision in the
Secrecy Act. In practice, those who seek information often ask for
more than the handing out of a particular document; they often require assistance in identifying the documents that are of interest to
them. Issues such as how much support and aid they should receive
and how precise requests for information and documents must be
30. See generally B. WENNERGREN, supra note 23, at 89; H. STRMBERG, supra
note 21, at 11-12.
31. For all practical purposes, they should also be accessible to foreigners. See
section 14.5 of the Freedom of the Press Act.
32. SOU 1975:22, Lag om allxnanna handlingar, at 27.
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are not regulated in Chapter 2 of the FPA. It is firmly established,
however, that the principle of public access does not include a right
to require that the authorities carry out investigations and
researches. 33 This means at least three things:
Requested documents must be sufficiently identified. The condition is, of course, met if the requester knows the formal identification of a case or matter (a docket number, for instance).
Other means of identification can also be accepted.
The authorities are not under any unconditional obligation to
collect information from documents in order to illuminate a
certain matter or activity.
The authorities are, however, under an obligation to search out
documents that have been identified by the requester although
the search may involve time-consuming and costly work.

(1)

(2)

(3)

Clearly, there is room for uncertainty, and the above principles
can be construed differently and in ways that are more or less in the
spirit of the principle of public access. It should be mentioned once
more that general information services of the public authorities are
not included in the right of access; the Secrecy Act states that the
authorities should inform the public about the contents of documents to the extent that such services do not interfere with their
normal work. Similar provisions about information which should be
provided to the public may be found in the General Ordinance for
the State Authorities of 19653 and in the Decree on Service to the
Public of 1972.35
Two particular matters of significance for the principle of public
access should be mentioned in this context. One concerns the extent to which the activities of the authorities are substantiated in
documents. The other concerns the registration of official documents. Obligations to document activities and decisions are now
regulated in a haphazard fashion. Provisions can be found in statutes such as the Public Administration Act of 197136 and in the detailed instructions for the authorities. The regulation of
documentation is not part of the legislation on rights of access; however, it is presently being reviewed by a legislative committee. 37 To
the extent that documents are created and kept, they constitute
archive materials and cannot be destroyed without the support of
33. See, e.g., cases cited in infra notes 56-57 and the accompanying text.

34.
35.
36.
37.

SFS 1965:600.
SFS 1972:406.
SFS 1971"290 (e.g., § 16).
FOrvaltningsrattsutredningen, Ju 1978:09.
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decrees issued by the Government which regulates the weeding out
of documents.
Registration of documents is now regulated by the Secrecy Act
of 1980. Registration is not a prerequisite for the official nature of a
document; however, it is of considerable practical value for the information seekers. If a document is not registered in a journal or index, then it may not be possible to know of its existence. The
present position is that official documents must be registered unless
it is evident that they are of small concern for the work of the authority. For official documents that are not to be kept secret it is
possible to let arrangement of the documents replace registration so
that problems will not arise as to what documents have been received or drawn up. Registration is considered particularly important for secret documents. The registers are, of course, open. They
should contain information such as the date when the document
was received or drawn up, the document number or some other
identification, the party who has sent in or received the document,
and a summary statement of the subject matter of the document.
Information belonging to the two last-mentioned categories may be
excluded if it is necessary in order to keep the register open to the
public without risk of violations of secrecy requirements.
Secret registers may be maintained for certain documents
whose very existence must be kept secret. Such registers are extremely rare, however, since in most cases basic information can be
provided about the existence of secret documents. Notices may be
put on documents stating their secret nature and the applicable provision on secrecy. The effect is only a caution (a "warning signal")
for a document bearing a notice may nevertheless be found to be
available to the public. The secrecy of a document does not depend
upon the existence of a notice of secrecy.
Upon request, a document must be made available on the premises immediately or as soon as possible for inspection and copying.
There is no charge for such access; however, the requester must pay
a stipulated fee if he chooses to have a copy made (usually a few
crowns per page). Access cannot be denied to documents that are
only partly secret. If the document containing secret parts cannot
be made available in such a manner that the secret parts are not revealed, then the authority must provide a free-of-charge copy that
contains only the open parts. To eliminate risks of damage or abuse
that constitute grounds for secrecy, an authority may condition the
handing out of documents upon restrictions or conditions that make
it a criminal offense to reveal or use the document and the information contained in it in certain ways. Otherwise it is not permitted to
impose such restrictions or conditions.
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Decisions to withhold documents or to make their release dependent upon restrictions and conditions can be appealed. Normally, appeals are made to the administrative courts of second
instance and to the Supreme Administrative Court. It is explicitly
stated in the Freedom of the Press Act that proceedings should be
expedited. There are no restrictions on the right to appeal a case to
the court of highest instance; however, decisions to make documents
available cannot be appealed. If a private party suffers harm
through the release of an official document, then the remedy consists of making a complaint that the document was released unlawfully to the Parliamentary Ombudsmen or to the Chancellor of
Justice.
B.

COMPUTERIZED DATA

The nature of machine-readable data has raised the issue of
whether computer media can be considered documents. During the
1960's, the Supreme Administrative Court decided two cases involving the scope of the Secrecy Act of 1937 with regard to magnetic
tapes for computers. 38 Data stored on such tapes were considered
secret according to certain provisions in the act. It could be argued
that both decisions implied that the document concept should be
construed broadly so as to cover machine-readable data. Neither
case, however, was based on such reasoning, and the Secrecy Act of
1937 referred to both "documents" and "facts." The issue was explicitly discussed only by the minority in the case decided in 1965.
The two chief justices concluded that technological developments
led to the usage of various types of recordings, such as punched
plates and cards, rolls for machines that record speech, and other
types of mechanical and electronic recordings which replace traditional written documents. According to the minority, the term "document" refers to written documents. The term must not, however,
be construed narrowly. Instead, the term "document" should also
be understood to cover new forms of storing "information materials," including magnetic tapes for computers.
In a case decided by the Supreme Administrative Court in
1971,3 9 the issue of whether magnetic tapes may be regarded as documents came to the fore. The case concerned a population fie
maintained by a county and did not involve the possible application
of the Secrecy Act. A private firm had requested that a copy be
made of the fie but the County Administration Board refused to
grant the request. The Board argued that magnetic tapes could not
38. RA 1965 ref 25; RA 1969 ref 11.
39. RA 1971 ref 15.
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be considered to be documents and consequently could not be available under the principle of public access. Magnetic tapes, the Board
stated, should be regarded merely as a means to produce documents
which then may be official and available to the public. The Supreme
Administrative Court followed the reasoning of the minority in the
1965 case and found that the word "document" need not be construed narrowly but may cover all kinds of methods and media that
are used to record and keep information. The Court pointed out in
particular that if the problem were not solved in this way, the usage
of new data storage media would considerably limit the right of access guaranteed by the Swedish Constitution. The County Administration Board then consented to making a copy of the tape available.
In doing so the Board apparently assumed that the right of access
includes a right to obtain copies of data in machine-readable form.
The Supreme Administrative Court had been silent about the manner in which requests for access should be met, and the question of
whether machine-readable copies must be distributed has remained
uncertain despite the 1971 decision.
The Swedish case serves as an interesting comparison with a
similar case from the United States involving the application of the
Freedom of Information Act of 1966 (FOIA). In 1979, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the FOIA applies equally
to computer tapes and written public records ° Neither the Swedish
nor the American decision is surprising, however, since the right of
access would soon be rendered meaningless if data stored on computer media were generally exempted. On the other hand, the inclusion of machine-readable data is only the first obstacle to be
resolved, and many problems pertaining to existing differences between automated and manual methods of organizing and processing
data still remain.
The first problem is determining how to incorporate computers
and computer-readable media into the existing rules on the right of
access. Three alternatives have been discussed in Sweden:
(1) Computer media might be subsumed under the document concept. In this case, identical rules would be applied to all categories
of storage media.
(2) Computers and computer media might be regulated separately
and by special rules. Such regulations would be identical to those
applying to ordinary documents but would take into account the
particular characteristics and problems of automated data
processing.
40. Long v. Internal Revenue Serv., 596 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1979) cert. denied, 446
U.S. 917 (1980).
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(3) Computer media might be considered to be "documents." Regulations applicable to ordinary written media would have to be
amended so that the term "document" would apply to both media.
These alternatives have been considered in connection with the
1974 and 1978 revisions of Chapter 2 of the FPA. The discussion is
still not complete since the committee presently engaged in revising
the public access rules, the Data Legislation Committee, recently
suggested special legislation to deal with the right of access to recordings for automatic data processing. The proposal of the Data
Legislation Committee will be discussed below.
The Committee on Publicity and Secrecy proposed that recordings for automatic data processing be regulated separately. In its
1972 report, the Committee introduced the concept "official recordings for automatic data processing" to complement the traditional
concept "official documents. '41 In so doing, the Committee chose a
different solution from its predecessor, the Publicity Committee,
which had suggested in 1966 that the rules applying to ordinary documents be extended without any amendment to cover computerreadable media. 42 The Committee on Publicity and Secrecy criticized this approach claiming that it would leave a number of
problems of construction and application without clear solutions.
For example, it would be difficult to determine when computer-readable data would be official and what form such data should take for
distribution.
The Ministry of Justice did not follow the strategy suggested by
the Committee on Publicity and Secrecy in its continued effort to revise the Freedom of the Press Act. Instead, preference was given to
alternative three described above. As a result, identical basic rules
now apply to traditional documents and computer media, and computer media are by definition "documents." Section 2:3 of the FPA
states that "a document is a presentation in writing or in picture
form or a recording which can be read, listened to or in any other
way perceived only by technical means." The basic rules for all
kinds of documents have therefore been tailored to include computer media. Special rules to determine when recordings for automatic data processing should be considered to be "in the keeping" of
an authority and when such recordings can be said to have been "received" have also been promulgated.
The concept of "keeping" requires more than mere physical
presence. For instance, an authority should not be able to refuse access on the ground that data that it uses via its terminals are stored
41. SOU 1972:47, Data och integritet, at 15 & 72-74.
42. SOU 1966:6, Offentlighet och sekretess, at 12 & 130.
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in the computer of another authority or of a private service bureau.
A criterion that fulfills the same functions as physical presence in a
simple sense must be formulated. The FPA has accomplished this
by stating that a recording is considered to be in the keeping of an
authority if the recording is available to the authority for transformation into such a form that it may be read or otherwise perceived.
For instance, a recording (computer-readable data) is considered to
be kept by an authority if it can be accessed via a computer network
and read on a terminal or if the authority can use the computer of
another authority to transform the recording into a print-out. Although the second method may result in a delay, this is of no princi43
pal significance.
The Committee on Publicity and Secrecy suggested a somewhat
more narrow definition of the concept of "in the keeping of." In its
1975 report the committee placed emphasis on the legal right of an
authority to transfer information into documentary form. The regulation presently in force is more generous toward the public in that
it emphasizes "factual access." This means that, to the extent that
there exists a practical possibility of transforming machine-readable
data into ordinary readable form, the public cannot be denied access
on the ground that there exist laws, prescriptions, instructions,
agreements, or other similar restrictions that prevent the authority
itself from accessing certain recordings. Thus, in order to limit the
right of access of the public, it is necessary to technically prevent
the authority itself from transforming particular data into readable
form. This may be accomplished through access control in on-line
systems, through withholding of computer programs, or by various
other means. In the case of computerized files containing personal
data, however, the public has no right of access to recordings that
are unavailable to the authority itself because of certain legal restrictions. This exception makes it possible for the Data Inspection
Board to impose effective restrictions on the usage of personal data
with respect to the right of public access."
Recordings can be received by an authority in a manner similar
to the way that ordinary documents are received. For example,
someone may give a magnetic tape to an official. Transmission in
computer networks, however, may be more involved, and in those
situations the rule for traditional documents is inappropriate. 45 According to section 2:6, paragraph one of the FPA, a recording for
EDP is considered to have been received by an authority when an43. Government Bill 1975/76:160, at 89.

44. Id. at 88 & 122.
45. Id. at 136-37.
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other party has made the recording available to the authority so that
it can be converted into a readable form. Thus, the concepts of
"keep" and "receive" are both based upon the practical possibility of
producing a version of data that can be read or otherwise perceived.
Situations may occur when an authority allows an unauthorized
person to process or store data that are then made available to the
authority. For instance, the unauthorized person may be ordered to
convert texts into machine-readable data that are made available to
the authority that ordered the conversion. In situations like this it
would be inappropriate to consider the recording to have been "received" by the authority. Consequently, section 2:6, paragraph
three, of the FPA states that technical processing or technical storage of a document that has been supplied by an authority does not
classify the document as "received" by the authority. Note that the
provision covers documents in general and not just EDP
recordings.46
Special rules for recordings have been deemed unnecessary to
incorporate the concept of draw up. The rules that apply to ordinary
documents apply equally well to recordings.
The rules that have been examined so far are the main rules for
EDP recordings. A closer look at some complementing details that
may be found in special rules for recordings as well as in general
rules will be helpful.
Section 2:4 of the FPA deals with letters and similar personal
messages. These are considered to be official documents if they deal
with matters or issues that are the concern of an authority and are
not intended for the addressee in another capacity than as an employee of the authority. Thus, a message to a person in his capacity
as a trade union representative and not as a public servant does not
become an official document even if it concerns an issue that is handled by the authority. This exception to the rule for personal
messages is of significance in the context of teledoc systems.
It was noted in Section IV.A. above that a special rule to decide
when "indexes of matters, journals, and such files or other lists
which are maintained continuously" should be considered to be
drawn up and consequently be official and accessible to the public.
A drawn up file usually occurs when "continuous" indexes and files
have been prepared for entry or posting. This rule covers more than
dockets and similar journals. In fact, use of the term "file" makes
the rule applicable to all kinds of EDP applications that involve ordered collections of machine-readable data. Before the 1978 revision
46. Id. at 137.
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of the FPA the scope of the term "fie" was uncertain. 47 The present
text of the provision and the accompanying clarifications in the preparatory legislative reports provide the following information. 48 According to the explanatory part of the Government Bill, the
provision applies to files which are continuously being updated and
which have an undetermined lifetime. The provision does not apply
to ifies that are created to solve a specific-task that is limited in time
and that has a short lifespan. Files of this latter type follow the
rules for recordings in general and are therefore treated differently
from ifies subject to the special rules. The general rules are discussed below.
1. The main rules in section 2:7, paragraph one, of the FPA are
applicable. For example, a recording, including a computer fie, will
be considered to be drawn up when it has been dispatched, when
the subject matter has been settled, or when the recording has been
approved or otherwise made ready by the authority.
2. EDP recordings containing certain kinds of information will
be subject to special rules. While the relevance of these rules is still
somewhat uncertain, they are mentioned for completeness.
a. Recordings that contain judgments or other decisions, according to the relevant legislation, must be pronounced or dispatched. In addition, if the recordings contain minutes or other
information relating to such decisions, then they are considered
to be drawn up when the decision has been pronounced or
dispatched.
b. Recordings may also contain minutes or similar records kept
by an authority. With certain exceptions such recordings are
considered to be drawn up when the minutes have been approved or otherwise made ready by the authority.
3. Recordings that have been prepared exclusively to present a
matter or to prepare it for decision and that have not been dispatched become official documents in the hands of the authority
that prepared them only if they are filed and kept for future use.
They become official documents when their subject matter has been
settled. Section 2:9, paragraph one, of the FPA states that recordings can be treated as memoranda. In addition, the explanatory section of the Government Bill states that items such as research
papers and indexes to collections of facts and collections of statistical source data may be treated as memoranda. To the extent that
factual information is added to a matter, a recording cannot be considered to be a memorandum.
47. P.

SEIPEL,

supra note 24, at 222-41.

48. Government Bill 1975/76:160, at 92-93, 143-44, 168-69.

19821

TELEDOC AND OPEN RECORDS

4. EDP recordings that constitute drafts of the decisions of an
authority, drafts of writings of an authority, or comparable documents and that have not been dispatched are not considered to be
official documents unless they are filed and kept for future use. Unfinished manuscripts are included in this category. The Government
Bill explicitly mentions EDP recordings which constitute intermediary products without independent interest.
Section 2:10 of the FPA contains a special rule for situations in
which documents are handled outside of an authority. The provision covers documents in general but is of particular importance for
EDP recordings. It states that documents that are being kept by an
authority on behalf of another party (a public authority or a private
firm) merely for technical processing or technical storage shall not
be considered to be official in the hands of the authority that
49
processes or stores the documents.
Section 2:11, subparagraph one, of the FPA states that letters,
telegrams, and other documents of a similar nature which have been
delivered to or drawn up by an authority exclusively for the communication of messages shall not be considered to be official documents. This provision has been included in the FPA to protect
ordinary letters and telegrams as well as notes and print-outs which
are made by the Post and Telecommunications authorities in connection with the forwarding of letters and telegrams. The provision
complements section 2:10 of the FPA which does not have an
equally broad coverage with respect to recordings and other documents created in connection with transmissions. The phrase "other
documents of a similar nature" broadens the scope of the Act. Copies and extracts of messages that are not protected under section
2:10 may therefore be protected under section 2:11 of the FPA.5 0
EDP recordings that are official documents can be exempted
from the right of access in the same manner as ordinary documents.
This exemption is a result of specific provisions in the Secrecy Act
of 1980. In principle, the Secrecy Act does not distinguish between
ordinary documents and EDP recordings. There are a few exceptions, however, such as Chapter 7, section 16, which concern computerized files containing personal data. On the other hand, the
secrecy problems that occur in the framework of computer systems
are not identical to the problems in manual data processing systems. Special attention must be paid to the possibilities of linking,
selecting, and retrieving data, to the need for access controls in online systems, and perhaps most importantly, to the problem of as49. Id. at 171.
50. Cf. id. at 172-73.

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. III

sessing in advance which usages of data are sensitive and should
therefore be viewed as breaches of secrecy according to the Secrecy
Act. In particular, it should be recalled that the Secrecy Act is
based mainly on the principle that no document may be kept secret
unless its publicity could, on careful consideration, cause specific
damage.5 1 This test becomes particularly difficult when requests are
made for data in computer systems and, generally, when secrecy
problems of computer systems are evaluated. These difficulties will
be illustrated by the subsequent discussion of the concept of a
"recording."
In a request for data from computer systems, it is generally accepted that an authority may decide the manner in which a recording is made available on the premises of the authority. The main
requirement is that the recording can be inspected, copied or otherwise studied.5 2 This means that an authority can choose between
providing information in the form of a printed listing and providing
information on a computer terminal display. The requirement that
data be made available immediately, or as soon as possible, however, may be interpreted to mean that an authority cannot delay the
fulfilling of a request by offering a print-out when data can be read
immediately and more conveniently on a CRT terminal. This conclusion is uncertain, but it finds support in section 2:12, paragraph
two of the FPA. Under that section, an authority may refer the requester to another authority in the vicinity provided that the latter
authority can make the recording available without significant inconvenience for the requester. In regard to requests for copies of recordings, section 2:13 of the FPA states that an authority is under no
obligation to distribute copies of EDP recordings in forms other
than print-outs. In other words, the right of access does not mean
that data can be obtained in machine-readable form. The reason for
this restriction is that the availability of machine-readable data in53
creases the risk of invasion of privacy.
It is of no significance whether or not the authority that keeps
the data uses a computer of its own. The required computer
processing must, in principle, be carried out even if "external"
equipment must be used. The information seeker, however, may
have to accept delays and the request may even be denied if there
are considerable obstacles such as high costs. In this situation the
requester may remove the obstacle by contributing to the costs or
51. Cf. SOU 1975:2, Lag om allmanna handlingar, at 27.
52. Cf. SOU 1980:31, Offentlighetsprincipen och ADB, at 78; Government Bill

1973:33, at 82.
53. Government Bill 1975/76:160, at 181.
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by arranging computer time.5
Matters are even more complicated for software facilities. Interest is focused on the obligation of an authority to write or to adjust
computer programs, or, more generally, to assist the requester in obtaining certain data.
In 1974, the Supreme Administrative Court decided a case in
a
which a person seeking information from the computer files of 55
County asked that certain data be selected from a magnetic tape.
The court found that the right of access depends upon whether the
requester's instructions for the selection of data requires the authority to perform significantly more work than that required for the
printing of the data. Since programs that "covered" the requested
selection existed, the court concluded that no extra work was necessary and that the data that had been requested should be sorted out
and printed. A closer look at the decision reveals that the two issues to be considered are what work in terms of programming and
related activities can be demanded, and what selections, mergings,
and so forth of data can be requested.
A decision rendered by the Supreme Administrative Court in
197656 sheds light on both issues. The case involved a situation in
which standard programs were available but these programs had to
be used with particular control cards in order to produce the required print-out of recordings. The court found that the authority,
the Central Bureau of Statistics, was under an obligation to produce
the control cards and to complement the programs. This would be
equivalent to the work required to locate and sort out traditional
documents. In addition, the court stated that an authority must perform the extra programming necessary to exclude secret parts from
a print-out. Since this authority had to use different programs for
different fies in order to produce print-outs, however, it had no obhgation under the FPA to bring the data concerning each individual
into one list.
In the following year, the Supreme Administrative Court decided another case which concerned the printing out of a particular
selection of addresses from the total population fie, the RTB ifie, of
the Central Bureau of Statistics. 57 The court concluded that the
principle of public access gives a right to request a selection of data
from one file (the RTB fie) that refers to persons in two other
specialized files. In particular, the court found that the extra work
54.
55.
56.
57.

Government Bill 1973:33, at 81; Government Bill 1975/76:160, at 89.
RRK 1974, R74 2:26.
RRK 1976, R76 2:70.
RA 1977, Ab-310.
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was made necessary because data was stored in different files by
the authority. The right of public access could not be set aside because the authority had chosen, for practical reasons, to store basic
data in a separate file.
Viewed together, the three decisions rendered by the Supreme
Administrative Court illustrate the difficulties of dealing with EDP
recordings. They reflect basic problems that concern the ways in
which data can be organized and used with the aid of computers.
The issues have been dealt with on various occasions by the Swedish lawmakers during the 1970's. A closer look shall be taken at relevant parts of the explanatory report of the Government Bill which
58
led to the latest revision of Chapter 2 of the FPA.
An understanding of the concept of a "recording" is fundamental. This concept should not refer to a separate data storage medium, such as a magnetic tape or disc, nor should it refer to an
isolated data element, such as a number. It is necessary, in order to
define the concepts, to take into consideration the purpose of the
right of access, which is to enable inspection of information that is
controlled by an authority. From this point of view, it is of
subordinate interest whether the requested data constitute a selection from a large collection of data, a merger of data from several
files, or a result of some other type of processing. Thus, according to
the Government Bill, each set of data that "factually belongs together," or that together provides meaningful information, should be
considered to be a separate "recording." It may even be stated that
any set of data that may be requested constitutes a recording. An
authority is not, according to the main rule, entitled to inquire into
the purpose of a request or the context in which the requested data
are to be used. The situation thus is quite different from the one involving traditional documents in that traditional documents contain
"packages" or "chunks" of data that are relatively easy to distinguish, the existence of which does not depend upon subjective
choices and technical facilities for processing data. In the computer
systems of the authorities no such "stable packages" exist. The
question then is which packages of data should an authority be
under an obligation to put together for presentation and not which
"data packages" does an authority have that can be requested.
The question of whether or not a recording can be requested is
quite similar to the question of which obligations are placed on the
authorities with respect to the processing and retrieval of data that
are "in their keeping." It must be remembered that the basic principle is that both the information seekers and the authorities should
58. Government Bill 1975/76:160, at 89-91.
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have equal access to information. A request need not be granted if
it refers to data that are not considered to be available to the authority itself. How, then, should "availability" be understood?
"Theoretical" availability would mean that any set of data that
an authority, in theory at least, can obtain from its computer systems should be available to the public under the FPA. Availability,
however, is defined in a more narrow, practical sense since a certain
selection or merging of data is considered to be available to an authority if, and only if, the data set can be produced by routine measures. If more complicated work must be performed to meet a
request for data, the writing of a new computer program, for instance, then these data are not considered to be available to the authority. Whether the measures that have to be performed are
termed "programming" is not decisive. It may be that writing a program or adjusting an existing program can be considered to be a
routine measure. Moreover, the person seeking information may
himself make a required program available, in which case the authority must arrange for the program to be run if it is merely routine. Just as in the case of arranging hardware resources, the
requester may have to accept a delay and may have to contribute to
the costs in order to overcome "significant obstacles" to obtain a requested recording. In summary, the key concept is "routine measures." This still leaves room for a certain amount of discretion as to
which requests are covered by the right of access under the FPA.
There are at least two advantages associated with the solution
which has now been described. First, there is no immediate need to
decide whether a request involves a need for "programming." This
is significant since the word "programming" is not very precise. The
spectrum of activities ranges from the detailed step-by-step description of procedures to be carried out by a computer to the providing
of parameter values to a report generator. Shaping a query in an
on-line information retrieval system using Boolean operators and
full text searching may be more difficult than introducing minor
changes into an existing computer program. Consequently, it seems
well-advised not to give the terms "program" and "programming"
any central role. The second advantage is that a solution based on
the notion of "routine measures" is flexible with respect to future
developmerits. The Government Bill of 1975-76 points out that continued advances in the areas of hardware, software, and data-bases
will broaden the right of access to the information resources of the
authorities. Hardware and software developments may tend to
change the principle of equal access to give increased weight to the
theoretical availability of sets of data.
The application of the Secrecy Act to EDP recordings requires
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that the question of exemptions be answered for each recording, or
for each set of data that is requested. Sometimes a whole ifie may
be exempted, as is the case with certain fies of the police authorities, or data that are being used in certain activity may be protected
generally and unconditionally. 59 In many situations, however, it will
be more difficult to decide in advance the consequences of the Secrecy Act for the right of access to EDP recordings. For example,
this may occur if a person wishes to inspect the data-bases of an authority from one of its terminals.
In 1979, the Supreme Administrative Court denied a person's request to use a terminal to inspect, without supervision, the auto60
mated docket of the Administrative Court of Appeals in Jonkoping.
The appellate court had granted a right to inspect the fie with the
aid of a court official. The refusal was motivated by security reasons
since the two computer terminals of the court could be used to read
as well as to register data, thus making it possible for someone who
used the terminal to change or erase data. The court considered it a
difficult or impossible task to check afterwards for tampering. Citing
the Committee on Publicity and Secrecy, the court emphasized that
computer processing performed by parties other than the authorities themselves must often involve risks that data are destroyed or
changed. In addition, the court emphasized the expense and interference with the court's ordinary work if it were to let the public use
its terminals. Since the two terminals were not protected against
unauthorized input the judgment offers only limited guidance. The
opinion does not touch upon a possible duty to protect against tampering with data, nor does it mention the possibility of permitting
access via other terminals that do not allow more than reading of
data. In the case involving the teledoc system KOM 79 these issues
have been treated in greater detail.
V. THE TELEDOC SYSTEM OF THE FOA
A teledoc system is used for the communication of messages in
the form of text between users of computer terminals. It permits activities that are similar to both exchange of letters and telephone
calls between two persons. Moreover, the system can support "conferences" involving a large number of participants who do not have
to be present at their terminals at the same time. The computer administers the contributions and commentaries of the users. A
teledoc system may also be used for work on reports and similar
products on which a number of individuals cooperate to complete a
59. Secrecy Act, § 8:8,
60. RA 1979 2:34.
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text. It can be used for referenda and similar polls, for the posing of
questions to a broad circle of persons, for advertising, and for notifications. 61 Teledoc systems may be usefully combined with other
computer applications such as text editing, information retrieval,
and planning and statistics.
The teledoc system of FOA is a so-called database system. It allows communication between hundreds of users at locations across
the country. Even very simple terminals may be used, such as
"typewriters" with a built-in acoustic system that can be attached to
ordinary telephones. From a technical point of view, the system is
advanced and a joint European research project on data networks,
the so-called COST-11 project, has recently engaged a Swedish firm
for further development. The specifications of the system have been
worked out by the FOA, which obtained the first license to operate
the system from the Data Inspection Board. Without going into details, a few words may be said about the application of the Swedish
Data Act of 1973 to the KOM system.
When the FOA first applied for a license in 1978, the Data Inspection Board turned the application down. Perhaps the most crucial reason was that the Board considered the description of the
usage to be so vague that it was impossible to issue any prescriptions for the system. These prescriptions are given for each "file of
personal data" and concern such things as the purpose of the system (the fie), its contents, its uses, and security measures. The
Board also referred to various problems caused by the proposed
system in regard to working conditions and the right of access to official documents.
The FOA renewed its application and provided more precise information about the intended system. A license was granted in
March 1979. It may be noted, however, that one of the members of
the Board, the representative of the federation of the white-collar
workers (TCO), expressed his reservations. The Board granted a
provisional license which terminated on March 30, 1981. A new license for an indefinite period was granted after certain changes in
the system, which is now called KOM 81 or, simply, KOM, were
made. The text fie of the system is no longer regarded as a 'Tile of
personal data" under the Data Act.
The FOA is the "responsible keeper" of the system (the file)
which may be used by employees of the FOA and by the personnel
of other public authorities, organizations, and private companies
that are involved in various projects with the FOA. Both KOM 79
61. See the FOA reports cited in supra note 9. See also decisions of the Data Inspection Board March 21, 1979 (DN 114-79) and March 10, 1981 (DN 4203-80).
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and its successor KOM 81 consist of a number of files. Certain
changes were made in the older structure which permitted retrieval
of recordings on the basis of the text contained in individual
messages. The present fies are described below.
1. The User File provides information regarding all the users of
the system. In addition to such data as each user's name and password, the fie contains references to index files for all activities in
which each user participates and all letters to and from a user. For
each reference to an index fie, the user fie registers whether that
user is allowed to read and write or only to read. The user fie can
also automatically transmit to a particular computer all or some
messages to a particular person.
2. The Activity File contains information regarding all activities
in the system. This information consists of sets of messages that are
exchanged among users who form a particular group. The fie states
the purpose and the organizer of each activity, as well as the procedure for becoming a participant in the activity. Some activities, in
which it is not possible to write messages directly, are reserved for
messages that are obtained from other activities. These then function as collections of particularly interesting or important messages
from other activities.
3. The Index File consists of one subfile for each activity and
contains references to the messages of each activity. Each reference
states the message's author, addressee, location in the computer,
time of validity, connection to other messages, and various other
data. For messages that have been received from other teledoc systems, the source and the time of transfer are registered. The index
fie also contains references to the keyword fie.
4. The Key Word File lists key words or similar brief descriptions of the messages that are stored in the system. Data concerning individuals may not be used as key words.
5. The Text File has one subfile for each activity and each user.
It contains the actual texts of the messages belonging to a certain
activity and of the letters to and from a certain user. Texts are only
stored and copied as units, and it is not possible to retrieve information from them. Thus, texts can only be retrieved from the text efie
with the aid of references from the index fie, the key word file, and
the activity fie. In KOM 79 it was possible to retrieve information
directly from the text of messages. This meant that in KOM 79 the
text fie had to be specially protected and that the FOA was under
an obligation to let persons know whether the text fie contained
any information about them.
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6. The Statistics File is a support file for charging fees and for
statistical analyses of the uses of the system.
Each computer file containing personal data should, according
to the Data Act, have a preestablished purpose that has been accepted by the Data Inspection Board. A teledoc system such as
KOM 79/81 constitutes one ifie according to the terminology of the
Data Act. The original license covered the following purposes:
(1) collection and dissemination of information within the framework of the FOA's activities; (2) preparation of matters that are normally handled by the FOA; (3) contacts within and between the
personnel organizations of the FOA; and (4) evaluation of the functioning of the system. 62 The purposes of KOM 81 have been described in somewhat broader terms but the practical differences are
probably small.
The KOM system is protected by various security measures.
There were a number of restrictions regarding access to information
about persons in the text fie of KOM 79. These restrictions followed
the first decision of the Data Inspection Board, which held that the
text ifie came under the Data Act. The restrictions meant that
messages could only contain information that related to the activity
of the FOA. Therefore, certain sensitive facts listed in section 4 of
the Data Act, such as the fact that someone has committed a crime,
were unconditionally banned. Evaluative statements were only permitted in messages written by the person concerned or in messages
that concerned activities in which the person concerned had a right
to read as well as to write. There were certain exceptions with regard to promotion and other personnel matters. The systematic collection of data about one or more persons was not allowed, unless
the data was supplied by persons participating in a poll. Collecting
the names of persons who were members of a board, a project group
or similar unit, or who were the authors of writings belonging to a
certain subject area that was of interest for a particular activity was
also permitted.
To prevent unauthorized retrieval of personal data in KOM 79
and to allow persons to know what had been written about them
62. According to its application, the FOA wished to carry out "research" concern-

ing the usage of the system. The Board apparently considered this activity too broad
and changed it to "evaluation." This change in language, among other things, indicates that the Board in 1979 had a very hesitant attitude toward teledoc systems. The
1981 decision marks a clear change in this respect. Thus, the purpose of the file is
now described simply as "files of personal data which are required in connection with
a system for computer-assisted communication of text." The new policy has met
some opposition and the representative of the white collar workers union (TCO) has
once more registered a complaint.
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under section 10 of the Data Act, special rules had to be promulgated to properly identify persons in messages. Given names or initials were required to be stated. A user was only allowed to retrieve
information from messages that he was allowed to read, messages
either written by the person himself or addressed to the person or
included in activities in which the person had a right to read. The
elimination of the capability to retrieve information directly from
the text file has made things considerably easier but there are still a
number of restrictions on the methods of retrieving and reading
messages. In both the new and the old system, user access is controlled through personal passwords. Furthermore, the texts of
messages are stored in enciphered form so that even the people who
perform system maintenance and who are responsible for its overall
evaluation will not be able to understand.
The author of a message may set a time limit for its validity.
Likewise, the organizer of an activity may decide that all messages
included in the activity are only to be kept for a certain time. There
is a general obligation for the employees to see to it that all factual
information that is significant for the preparation of a matter is
printed out and kept for the future. The system has a special
"archive instruction" to facilitate the fulfillment of this obligation. It
is also possible to decide in advance that all messages belonging to
an activity are to be printed out and kept.
According to the FOA's directives for the usage of the system
' '63
there are four different types of "tele-meetings.
1. A "tele-meeting" is a meeting in which all users of the system may enter as participants, i.e., an open meeting;
2. A "limited tele-meeting" is an activity in which only a particular group of persons may enter as participants;
3. A "closed tele-meeting" is an activity in which only a limited
circle of persons participate; and
4. A "protected tele-meeting" is an activity in which the names
of the participants are known only to the participants.
KOM handles about 6,000 messages per month. Half of these
messages are letters that are read by only one person. The normal
length of a message is between ten and twenty lines, but there are
also messages that are considerably longer. Users are usually active
at the terminal twice a day and it is common to have ten users connected to the system at the same time. There are approximately 220
persons who use the system at least once per week and approximately 400 persons who use the system at least once every month.
63. These directives refer to KOM 79 and were issued in June 1979 (No. 10.4).
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The KOM system supports many kinds of FOA activities, such
as research and investigations, discussions, person-to-person communication, and preparation of decisions and decision-making.
Outside parties are also involved since the permit allows users
outside the FOA to be linked to the system. The activities are more
or less open and KOM is used at different stages of work on various
matters.
In November 1979, three persons asked for access to data relating to the acquisition of a new computer by the Stockholm Computer Center for Higher Education and Research (QZ). This center
services the FOA as well as a number of other institutions. The request caused some confusion at the authority, a reaction that is
probably typical as demonstrated by the inquiry by Mats Hedberg
mentioned earlier. The request was denied on the ground that data
in the system must be regarded as "memoranda" which are not official documents according to the exemption rule in section 2:9, paragraph one of the FPA.
The requesters appealed the issue to the Administrative Court
of Appeals in Stockholm and extended their request to include the
right to study the conversations and communications involving the
purchase of the computer, the right to gain access to the entire
KOM 79 system, and the right to use a terminal to inspect the system without supervision by officials of the authority.
The FOA further clarified the grounds for its refusal in a writing
to the court. The authority emphasized that the FPA recognizes the
need to protect information at the early stages of preparation of various matters. Teledoc systems may contain materials of many
kinds, including materials that can be considered to be official documents. The authority called attention to personal data that may not
be accessed by the authority itself because of the restrictions imposed by the Data Inspection Board and to messages related to the
activities of the organizations of FOA personnel. Neither of these
two categories of data could be regarded as official documents. As
for the two tele-meetings at issue, the FOA concluded that there
was no specific matter involved and that the two meetings only concerned the FOA's activities in general. Even if the two meetings
were regarded as concerning specific matters, however, the data
contained in them did not constitute official documents. The data
were regarded as memoranda that had neither been dispatched nor
taken care of to be kept for the future. Since, according to the FOA,
64. See supra notes 12-13 and cases cited therein.
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no formal matter was involved, the issue was simply how to label
the meetings. The FOA determined that the meetings ought to be
looked upon as "a symposium." The messages were to be regarded
as memoranda, recordings of interventions, and notes taken by
someone recording the symposium. From the point of view of the
authority, recordings made during a meeting should be looked upon
as a basis for possible future minutes. From the point of view of the
participants, the recordings should be considered personal working
documents. Thus, recordings could only become official documents
if they were finalized or in some other way made ready by the authority pursuant to section 2:7, subparagraph three, of the Freedom
of the Press Act.
The FOA also argued that the system did not contain any "public" meetings since only particular users were allowed to participate.
Most of the meetings were related to matters that had not been concluded, such as research projects which had not yet resulted in reports, and which, consequently, had not generated any official
documents. On the other hand, the FOA emphasized that the rules
on making print-outs would guarantee the right of access to recordings that constitute official documents. The conclusion of the FOA
was that the applicants could not be given access to the entire system, nor could they be given access to certain meetings. Thus, there
could be no talk about using terminals to inspect the system.
The requesters objected that the FOA's manner of labeling activities could not change the fact that the communication of texts
was involved. The criterion of the recordings "being kept" was fulfilled since they were available to the FOA in a readable form. The
crucial issue, which the applicants claimed the FOA had avoided
discussing, is that the case involved a situation in which messages
were being exchanged between several public authorities. It was
also the FOA's duty to design the system so that inspection could be
allowed without risks of violation of secrecy requirements. The
FOA's neglect to do so could not be used as a legitimate argument to
refuse usage of terminals by the public without control or supervision. There was no risk of unauthorized input or changes of data
since the system afforded adequate protection.
The Administrative Court of Appeals consulted the Data Inspection Board which issued the following statement:
It must be taken for granted that KOM 79 is being used by the FOA
in accordance with the license obtained from the Board and only
for the permitted purpose. Consequently, data in the system must
concern the activities of the FOA and be available to at least one of
the officials of the FOA in readable form. An exclusion could be
made for the activities of the organizations of the personneh
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messages in such activities ought to be exempted according to section 2:4 of the FPA which deals with private letters. For other
messages the following rules ought to apply:
(1) All messages that are made available in the system by parties
outside the FOA must be considered to have been received by the
FOA according to section 2:6 of the FPA. Such messages are therefore to be regarded as official documents which must be handed out
upon request.
(2) In regard to messages that are created by officials of the authority, official documents may result in two ways:
(a) There may be messages which, via a terminal or some other
means, are available to authorities and to private persons
outside the FOA. These messages are official documents since
they have been dispatched according to section 2:7, paragraph
one of the FPA,
(b) Other messages are available only within the authority itself.
(i) If such messages are related to a particular matter, they
should be regarded as official documents when the subject matter has been finally settled.
(ii) If such messages are not related to any particular matter,
they should be regarded as official documents when they
have been approved or otherwise made ready, or as soon
as they have been entered into the system. Internal
messages of this kind thus become official documents as
soon as they are written into the system.
The reasoning of the Data Inspection Board as it concerns messages
that are "drawn up" by the authority does not seem to leave any
room for exemptions of the kind mentioned by the FPA, such as
memoranda and drafts.
The Administrative Court of Appeals found that an authority is
free to decide how recordings are to be made available to the public.
An authority is under no obligation to allow information seekers to
handle terminals by themselves. Such a limitation on the principle
of public access serves to eliminate risks that texts in the database
are changed and that data is made available in violation of secrecy
requirements. The court found the remaining arguments of the
Data Inspection Board persuasive but the judgment is worded differently. Thus, the court concludes that, unless specific provisions
on secrecy apply, recordings that have been entered into KOM 79 by
external parties, authorities and private parties, should be considered to be publicly available. Messages that are created by the FOA
and that are available to external parties should also be considered
to be available to the public; however, a recording that is connected
with a matter handled by the FOA is not publicly accessible until
the recording has been dispatched or when the subject matter has
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been finally settled. Messages concerning the activities of personnel
organizations are not official documents.
The decision of the Administrative Court of Appeals is not clear.
It appears to confuse the different rules relating to the concept of
"draw up" in the second chapter of the FPA. In addition the reasoning of the Administrative Court of Appeals is not as clear as that of
the Data Inspection Board. The court, for instance, says nothing
about messages that are created within the FOA and that are not
made available to external parties. Should not such materials be
made available to the requesters? The court may have taken notice
of the way in which the requesters characterized the data involved:
all data were said to have crossed boundaries between authorities.
This description is incorrect. What about messages that are connected with matters handled by the FOA? Does not the fact that
such messages are made available in the system to external parties
mean that they have been dispatched ipso facto? Is something more
required? What?
The case was appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court
with respect to the right to use a terminal. The appellants argued
that such a right cannot be lawfully denied and that the principle of
public access would be seriously distorted if such a right were not
granted. The appellants claimed that it is possible to construct computer systems with access controls and other security measures and
to install special "presentation terminals" for the general public.
Deficiencies in this respect should not be permitted to limit the
principle of public access. The new technology does not mean anything qualitatively regarding the right to gain access to documents
in archives. There is, it was argued, no difference in access between
having a text available on paper and having it on a CRT screen to
the right of public access. In the case of conventional documents,
there is no requirement that an official be present and turn the
pages. The public may handle the documents themselves. The
same principle must apply to EDP recordings in order to avoid negative effects. The right of public access may be weakened. A requester will have no possibility of not revealing the nature of the
requested information. The personnel of the authorities will not
have time to assist the public in using terminals, especially in the
future when practically all information will be stored in computer
systems.
The Supreme Administrative Court decided this case in September, 1980. A database, the court stated, contains many kinds of
recordings. It should therefore be looked upon as a collection of information similar to an archive containing ordinary documents. The
right of public access does not mean that information seekers can
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visit archives, look for certain unspecified documents, and bring
them out of the archives. It is necessary to identify documents in
advance and this principle should also apply to databases. In particular, for each request it must be ascertained whether particular provisions in the Secrecy Act prevent access. The court concluded that
the FPA does not give a right to use a terminal to search out facts in
a database. The requester must ask for specific recordings and only
those recordings should be made available after examination of
their information contents.
VII.

A PROPOSED STATUTE ON THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO
EDP RECORDINGS

In the autumn of 1980, the Data Legislation Committee (DLC)
' 65
released a report entitled "The Principle of Publicity and ADP.
The report discusses the regulation presently in force and proposes
a new statute on the right of access to recordings for automatic data
processing. Another section of the report deals with active dissemination of information, or the need to supplement the right of public
access with information services of the public authorities. The subsequent discussion will deal with the proposal and, in particular, its
implications for teledoc systems.

A. THE NATURE OF THE PROPOSED STATUTE
The DLC proposal is not intended to be constitutional law. The
Committee considers the procedure required to change such law too
slow and prefers a supplemental law at a lower level which can
more easily be adapted to changes in technology and to new requirements and possibilities. 6 6 This legislative method is not without its risks and may violate principles set out in constitutional law.
The Committee is, of course, aware of these problems and has attempted to solve them by careful formulation of certain sensitive
provisions.
The purpose of the DLC proposal is to illuminate and clarify the
rules of access to EDP recordings for both the authorities and the
general public.67 To achieve this goal, the statute contains numerous references to laws and decrees that concern EDP recordings.
Thus, references are made not only to provisions in the Freedom of
the Press Act and the Secrecy Act, but also to other statutes such as
the General Ordinance on Archives (1961:590) and the Data Act
(1973:289). In this respect, the DLC proposal contains nothing new
65. SOU 1980:31, Offentlighetsprincipen och ADB.
66. Id. at 18 &44-46.
67. Id. at 19.
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but merely brings together and directs attention to legislation which
should or may be applied to the EDP systems of the public authorities. The proposed statute also contains a number of provisions that
aim at clarifying the current interpretation of the rules on the right
of access. It is particularly this effort which may be contrary to the
principle that lower level legislation should be in conformity with
the constitution or, more precisely, the rules in the FPA that guarantee the right of access to official documents. The Committee has not
been completely successful in avoiding the pitfalls. Certain interpretations of the FPA are questionable and several uncertain provisions in the DLC proposal may be harmful to the right of access.
The DLC proposal deals only with EDP recordings, although
many of the rules could just as easily apply to documents in general
and provide valuable guidance. For this reason the Committee has
discussed the possibility of broadening the statute in the future to
include ordinary documents as well as recordings. 68 The legislative
strategy to regulate EDP systems separately can be questioned, but
it is apparent that EDP systems require particular attention because
of their present uncertainty. From this point of view, the DLC proposal seems both useful and reasonable.
B.

BASIC PRINCIPLES

Section 3 of the DLC proposal cites two related basic principles
that are to guide practices in computer systems in the public sector.
According to the first principle, the right of access to recordings
stated in the FPA and in the DLC proposal should be taken into
consideration when computer systems are designed, changed, and
used. This means that authorization schemes and access controls
ought to be devoted such special care as the principle of public access motivates. 69 For example, it should be possible to routinely exclude secret information when recordings are made available. It
should also be possible to allow information seekers to use terminals for retrieval without supervision.
The second principle expressed in section 3 of the DLC proposal
states that recordings should be available to the public to the same
extent that they are available to the authority. This availability refers to "practical availability" and is based upon the possibility of
accessing information through "routine measures." On closer scrutiny one finds that the scope and intended impact of the suggested
principle are uncertain. It would require extended and costly efforts
to restructure all existing EDP systems of the public authorities in
68. Id. at 54.
69. Id. at 41, 53, 78 & 85.
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order to create a situation in which all requests can be met without
delays and fees. From this point of view, then, the principle of
equality may look disturbing to many public authorities. On the
other hand, the principle explicitly refers to obstacles posed by the
Secrecy Act. This may prove to be a weak spot since for many EDP
systems it can easily be claimed that it is not possible to foresee the
secrecy problems and structure the systems accordingly. Such difficulties could be used as excuses not to take any measures at all to
implement the principle of equal access.
C.

REGISTRATION AND DOCUMENTATION

Section 4 of the DLC deals with the registration of recordings
that have been received or drawn up by an authority. It contains
nothing but a reference to the relevant provisions in the Secrecy
Act. To a certain extent this means that insufficient attention is devoted to many complicated problems associated with the registration of EDP recordings. Registration of conventional documents and
of recordings in EDP systems pose quite different problems and, as
will be discussed shortly, the committee has found it necessary to
complement the existing rules for registration with special rules on
the documentation of EDP systems used by the public authorities.
There are a number of reasons why registration of EDP recordings requires special attention. Data bases and telecommunications
have radically changed the ways in which information is recorded
and made available. The implications for the three key concepts in
the Freedom of the Press Act, that recordings are "in the keeping of
an authority," that recordings have been "received," and that recordings have been "drawn up" by an authority have already been discussed. The unavoidable vagueness of the concept of a "recording"
should also be recalled, as well as the equally vague nature of the
concept of a "matter." Briefly, when is an activity of a public authority to be classified as a "matter" and how should activities be structured in terms of one or more "matters?"7 0 The criteria are vague
and may permit an authority to decide rather arbitrarily how its activities should be divided into matters. The use of computer
databases probably increases the uncertainty and may lead to negative effects for the right of access.
In the KOM 79 case, the Data Inspection Board and the Administrative Court of Appeals were faced with difficulties in attempting
to structure and define teledoc systems in terms of the rules on the
right of access. The appellate court opinion is based on schematic
reasoning, and the question may be asked whether more flexible so70. Government Bill 1975/76:160, at 97.
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lutions should be sought and whether such solutions can fit within
the present rules of the FPA. The arguments set forth by the FOA
in its writing to the court indicate the nature of the problems: Can
teledoc systems contain recordings that must be viewed as memoranda and drafts? Are there "meetings" in the system that can be
said to be "closed" to the general public? Can communication
through a teledoc system be viewed as a "symposium" in which the
participants take notes and in which data may be regarded as a basis for possible future minutes to be drawn up by the organizing authority? These issues shall be investigated although some of them
go beyond the issue of registration of recordings.
A recording should be considered to be in the keeping of an authority when it is available for transformation by "routine measures" into a form that can be read or otherwise perceived. It is not
necessary, however, that the recording has actually been accessed
and used by the authority. The Data Inspection Board points out in
its writing to the court concerning the KOM 79 system that it is sufficient that the recording is available to at least one of the officials of
an authority. The physical location of the data base, as well as its
public or private nature, are of no significance. One of the consequences of these rules appears to be that, in principle at least, the
public can claim access to recordings in a data base run by a private
organization in another country to the extent that a Swedish public
authority has access to the database. At the present stage it is difficult to foresee the various problems associated with the extension of
the right of access in data networks.
A recording emanating from the outside can hardly be considered to be in the keeping of an authority before it has been received.
Someone outside the authority must have created a recording (a
message or a file) and taken steps so that it can be routinely converted into readable form by the "receiving" authority, or by at least
one of the officials of the receiving authority. On the other hand, it
does not mean that the receiving authority must actually know that
the recording has been made available, nor does it mean that the recording must actually have been read by someone at the receiving
authority. Even a "dormant" recording is an official document if
routine measures can make it deliver its information.
According to the registration provision in section 15:1 of the Secrecy Act, official documents, including recordings, should be registered without delay after they have been received or drawn up. In a
computer system, registration by manual means would be awkward
and would result in various types and combinations of computerized
index files. Such files must, according to section 15:2 of the Secrecy
Act, provide such information as the date when the recording was
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received, its index number or other form of identification, the
sender, the addressee, and its main contents. The last item is particularly essential for the effectiveness of the right of access; keywords,
classification systems, references, and so forth should be designed
to make it easy for the public to find relevant materials. Such aids
should also take into account the interests of various branches of
the social sciences including history and law. Today's indexing systems are weak in this respect and are only intended to serve the immediate needs of the authorities themselves. It remains to be seen
whether section 3 of the DLC proposal can lead to any improvements, such as the requirement that EDP systems be designed with
due concern for the principle of public access.
To a certain extent, it is easy to decide what constitutes a recording and how a recording ought to be registered. An example of
that is a "letter" in a teledoc system intended for an individual official. As things become more complex, computer systems provide
excellent means of registration. An illustration of this is an intervention in a "conference" and the various messages associated with
it in the form of corrections, commentaries, and additions. In this
respect the new technology offers many advantages over manual registration and serves to strengthen the right of access. Difficulties
arise since, in principle, any meaningful combination of data constitutes a recording.
It appears necessary to distinguish between "basic" recordings
and "generated" recordings, although it should be emphasized that
the dividing line between the two categories is not clear. The registration requirements in the Secrecy Act concern the basic recordings category. A text message from the outside that is made
available in a teledoc conference in which a public authority participates would belong in that category. The second category consists
of all possible combinations on data that may be requested according to the rules on the right of access and that are official documents
according to the terminology of the law. One cannot realistically require that all such "generated" recordings be "registered." Their nature and number change constantly, and it is difficult to say when
each recording has been received or drawn up. Consequently, in
dealing with computer systems and data bases, attention will be focused on data structures and retrieval possibilities rather than on
recordings as such. The Secrecy Act permits registration to be replaced by "arranging documents" so that it can easily be established
whether a document/recording has been received or drawn up. It is
therefore possible to design data bases without thinking in the narrow categories of conventional "registration." Conversely, the requirement imposes obligations on the authorities with respect to the
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retrieval and classification facilities of their computer systems. The
DLC proposal does not deal with these difficulties in detail, but it
does contain a new requirement that "search keys" be documented,
as will be discussed below. It should be noted that the Secrecy Act
makes an exception for documents/recordings that are to be kept
secret. These recordings must always be registered as soon as they
have been received or drawn up unless the Government decides
otherwise. This registration requirement, therefore, will be particularly difficult to apply to "generated" recordings because advance
knowledge about all combinations of data that may be requested
and their possible threats to various secrecy requirements is not always available.
A discussion of the general problem of the point of time when
recordings should be considered to have been drawn up should begin with the reasoning of the Data Inspection Board and the Administrative Court of Appeals in the KOM 79 case. According to this
reasoning, messages are considered to be dispatched and thereby
drawn up as soon as they have been made available to external
users of the teledoc system. Messages that are not made available
to external users are considered to be drawn up when the related
matter has been concluded or, if they are not related to any matter,
when the messages have been stored in the teledoc system.
A schematic solution of this sort should not be heavily relied
upon. Teledoc systems may be used for many different purposes
and at different stages of work on a particular task.7 1 They may
serve both as a "scratch pad" for preliminary notes and as a means
of communicating completed texts expressing decisions, reports,
and opinions. Schematic legal reasoning is likely to prevent the full
use of the potentials of teledoc systems, an undesirable effect from
the point of view of the right of access. Moreover, public authorities
that use teledoc systems may define "matters" so as to avoid access
to recordings. The statutory language indicates that it should be
possible to treat EDP systems in a flexible way which leaves room
72
for exemptions involving recordings of an "intermediary" nature.
It may be questioned whether it is necessary to create completely new rules for teledoc systems which take into account their
special character as a novel means of communication. The FOA's
suggestion that some messages be treated as contributions to a
"symposium" may serve to illustrate this approach. Although novel
71. The FOA emphasizes this aspect by detailed language in its application for a
prolonged license. See decision of the Data Inspection Board March 10, 1981, DN 420380, at 19.
72. Cf. Government Bill 1975/76:160, at 91-92.
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concepts may be needed, however, the following comments will be
restricted to those relevant special rules in the FPA that are now in
force.
According to the Data Act, the teledoc system of the FOA constitutes a single file even though the system consists of a number of
files, such as the user fie and the activity file. Some of these files
contain subfies. Moreover, the text of a particular message may
sometimes be treated as a specific fie. The file concept is hierarchical and subjective. The physical organization of data need not be
decisive since different logical structures may all rely on the same
physical storage organization. This description of data structures
has many legal implications, the most important of which is that
there is a need for better structured legal views on databases. It is
important to determine the legal purposes of concepts such as "file,"
"recording," and "information from recordings" in the context of the
right of access.
To understand the implications of this determination, consider
section 2:7, subparagraph one, of the FPA. It states that "indexes of
matters, journals, as well as fies or other lists which are maintained
continuously," should be considered to be drawn up when they have
been prepared for entry or posting. The file concept of this provision should cover only certain types of ifies in a database: (1) files
that provide user-oriented search aids and guide the information
seeker to decisions, matters, parties, and activities, and (2) files that
store information concerning objects of a particular type and that require regular updating to enable a specific kind of activity associated with these objects to take place. These activities may include
supervision, inspection, investigation, regulation, and caretaking.
Thus, section 2:7, subparagraph one, of the FPA may apply to certain
files in a database, such as the KOM system, but not to the database
as a whole. The ifies in KOM that come within this provision are the
index file, the activity file, the user ifie, and the key word ifie.
Recordings that have been prepared exclusively to present a
matter or that have been prepared for decision become official when
they are dispatched. Storage in a teledoc system through which external parties may gain access to the recording should, as the Data
Inspection Board points out, be viewed as dispatching. It should not
be necessary that an external party has actually read the recording.
The fact that it is possible to read it should suffice. The effect of
storage in the teledoc system on "memoranda recordings," which
are only available internally within an authority, 4s also a crucial issue. Is storage to be regarded as placing a recording in an archive to
be kept for the future? Only if such storage takes place will the
"memorandum recording" be regarded as an official document. The
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question has no simple answer. The important point is that the effects of storage in the system are made clear in advance. A system
may have one sub-file that is used as an archive and another sub-fle
that is used for provisional storage of memoranda which may or
may not be placed in the archive fie. The provisional file should be
viewed as a desk drawer in which recordings may be kept for temporary use. Such personal storage by individual officials is not pres73
ently regarded as equivalent to placing in an archive.
Drafts and other intermediary recordings with or without connection to a matter are dealt with in section 2:9, paragraph two, of
the FPA. Again, storage that makes recordings available to external
parties must be viewed as dispatching. An exception exists, however, where an authority allows an external party to study drafts for
the purpose of providing advice without the recording being considered dispatched. Thus, consultations and similar activities can take
place in a teledoc system, and the recordings may still be regarded
74
as internal working documents.
"Draft recordings," which can only be accessed internally within
the authority, should not be considered to be stored merely by placing them in an archive. The solution in this case should be the same
as for "memoranda recordings." The Data Inspection Board concludes that storage in a teledoc system means that a recording has
been made ready. This principle is too general. The deciding factors must be the nature and contents of the recording. The fact that
a teledoc system is used for storage and communication is not
conclusive.
The Data Act presently contains a rule that simplifies the decision as to whether or not recordings are official documents. Thus, if
a recording is used for deciding a matter or if it influences the handling of a matter, then the recording should be printed out and
added to the documents that constitute the ifie of this matter, in accordance with section 13 of the Data Act. This rule is closely related
to section 2:9, paragraph one, of the FPA which states that documents/recordings cannot be excluded from the right of access as
"memoranda" to the extent that they add factual information to a
matter. The Data Legislation Committee has included this provision
75
as section 5 of their proposal.
The registration of recordings is associated with the need for
rules concerning the documentation of automatic data processing
73. Id. at 168.
74. Id. at 170.
75. Cf. SOU 1972:47, Data och integritet, at 90; SOU 1980:31, Offentlighetsprincipen

och ADB, at 48.

19821

TELEDOC AND OPEN RECORDS

systems. Section 6 of the DLC proposal suggests that public authorities that use EDP maintain a catalogue of the uses that should be
available to the public together with a copy of the proposed statute.
The catalogue should provide information regarding the purposes of
the various uses and the names of existing files and systems. Public
authorities that are responsible for the operation and maintenance
of EDP systems should, in addition, prepare system documentation
providing more detailed information on the types and sources of
data, the users of data, the concepts used for retrieval of data, the
rules that apply to the keeping and erasure of data, the particular
measures that have been taken to ensure the right of access, and
the relevant secrecy provisions. This enumeration has been subject
to criticism in that the Data Legislation Committee has overlooked
the fact that EDP systems to which public authorities have access
via on-line communication may be operated by private organizations. For such systems the DLC proposal contains no requirement
that system documentation be prepared and made available by the
authorities that use the systems.
D. ARcHIVEs
Section 8 of the DLC proposal deals with archives and erasure
of recordings. It contains references to various laws and decrees
and, in addition, suggests that special consideration be devoted to
the purpose of the usage of EDP, the right of access, the rule of law,
and scientific information needs. This section contains no new provisions, and the explanatory report of the committee does not delve
into the many problems of maintaining machine-readable data for
the future, an area that is presently quite uncertain. The volume of
machine-readable materials is rapidly growing since more and more
activities of the public authorities rely on the use of computers. The
National Swedish Records Office has only recently begun to experience and investigate these problems. Presently the authority stores
approximately 1,000 magnetic tapes, and its main problem seems to
be an inability to obtain explanatory documentation of sufficiently
high quality. The Central Bureau of Statistics, which stores about
10,000 magnetic tapes, is experiencing similar difficulties.
Experts in the field say that there is a need for a new theory of
storing computer-readable materials for the future. One of the questions under Swedish law concerns the extent to \which the right of
access ought to apply to historic materials; today there is no time
limit. As for teledoc systems, the questions concern not only the
possible storing of individual messages, but also the future interest
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in statistical and similar information concerning the use of the
systems.

E. ANONYMITY
The Data Legislation Committee describes the right to anonym'76
ity as "one of the most important elements of the right of access.
The right to anonymity consists of both a right to not be compelled
to reveal one's identity and a right to not reveal the purpose of a request for information. The latter right may, in fact, be the most important one. The right to anonymity is not explicitly stated in the
FPA and only recently has it been included in lower level legislation. Section 9 of the DLC proposal expresses this principle by stating that there should be a right to anonymity in so far as it is
unnecessary for an authority to learn the identity and the purpose
of a requester in order to decide whether secrecy must be maintained. The proposal also requires that security measures be
designed in order to preserve anonymity.
F.

INFORMATION SERVICES

The Data Legislation Committee considers it particularly important that persons who request information in computer systems obtain guidance and advice from the authorities. Section 10, paragraph
one of the DLC proposal concerns "information from a recording"
and refers to a provision in the Secrecy Act that prescribes that public authorities provide information from official documents so long
as this does not require secrecy or interfere with the ordinary work
of the authorities. This obligation is clearer in the context of ordinary documents than in the context of recordings. The problem,
again, is that a recording is not a set of data that is delimited and
determined at one time. Consequently, it is not always easy to decide what constitutes "information from a recording" and what constitutes a recording in its own right. The concept of "information
from a recording," however, is meaningful at least with regard to information that is derived intellectually from recordings.
The second paragraph of section 10 requires the authorities to
assist the public in exercising the right of access. The committee
considers such assistance particularly important when the information is retrieved from computer systems.
G.

ACCESS ON THE PREMISES OF AN AUTHoRrrY

Sections 11 through 14 of the DLC proposal describe the manner
76. SOU 1980:31, Offentlighetsprincipen och ADB, at 72.
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in which recordings should be made available on the premises of an
authority. An authority may choose how to make a recording available. The primary alternatives are an already existing printed list, a
specially made print-out, or text on a CRT terminal. This freedom
to decide the manner of presentation is not without problems. An
authority may delay the release of a recording by choosing a particular way of presentation. Moreover, some forms of presentation are
easier to understand than others. The Data Legislation Committee,
however, has not investigated such issues.
Section 14 deals with the right to use the computer terminals of
the authorities. The Committee assumes that the right of access
does not include a right to use a terminal. This assumption is consistent with decisions of the Government and of the Supreme Administrative Court. 77 It reflects the current interpretation of the
FPA, but it may be challenged for a number of reasons. The latest
Government Bill revising the rules on the right of access states that
an information seeker has a right to retrieve recordings with his
own program if such retrieval can be accomplished routinely and
without violating any of the provisions in the Secrecy Act.7 8 It may
be argued, then, that an information seeker has a right to retrieve
information by formulating queries at a computer terminal. Moreover, the right of access unquestionably allows a requester to look
through a docket, journal, or similar collection of information. Thus,
at least those files in a data base which are similar to traditional
materials that are open to browsing should, in principle, be available
for inspection and retrieval from terminals.
The Data Legislation Committee has adhered to the predominant interpretation of the FPA. The suggested right to use a terminal in the DLC proposal is intended to be a complementary right,
one not guaranteed by the constitution. The right is also subject to
conditions. There must be no risk of changing or destroying data,
and ordinary work must not be interfered with. Provisions in the
Secrecy Act can also bar the public from using terminals. In practice, the value of the right to use computer terminals will depend on
how public EDP systems are designed and the willingness of the authorities to abide by the principle of adapting EDP systems to the
right of access (section 3 of the DLC proposal). Ideally, databases
should be organized and computer facilities made available so that
interested parties can inspect large collections of data in order to
find items and activities of interest.
77. Decision of the Government, April 10, 1980 (Ministry of Justice, dnr 2177-79);

Judgments of the Supreme Administrative Court cited supra notes 14 &60.
78. Government Bill 1975/76:160, at 91.

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. I

On-line searches open new vistas for the right of access. Among
other things, a requester may discover during a search and with the
aid of the computer which information is of interest. Computerized
on-line searches usually permit the use of more flexible retrieval
strategies, and its speed can compensate for lack of precise knowledge about the recordings that are of interest. The computer can,
through "dialogue," narrow the request. There are also numerous
difficulties associated with the character of data and retrieval languages, and the lack of knowledge about retrieval methods. While
some of these difficulties will remain, others will disappear as computer systems improve and as the public becomes more educated in
computerized means of retrieval.

H. PRinT-OUTS AND COPIES OF MACHINE-READABLE DATA
Section 15 of the DLC proposal contains nothing new. It merely
mentions the right to get a print-out of recordings at a preestablished fee which is further regulated in section 18. According to this
provision, fees should be low enough to permit the exercise of the
right of access. The concluding part of section 15 states that public
authorities may hand out copies of machine-readable data unless
the Data Act or other restrictions prevent this.

I. THE

PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL ACCESS

The public should have access to recordings that are available to
the authorities. Recordings that can be generated by routine measures (simple work, insignificant extra costs) are considered to be
available. Section 16 states this principle in a confused way which
creates uncertainty and confuses constitutional rights with less important obligations of the authorities to provide service and
information.
J.

OTHER ISSUES

The concluding sections 17 through 19 of the DLC proposal deal
with time limits for supplying information, fees for obtaining printouts, and appeals. Existing rules are brought together and in some
respects clarified.
VIII. ACTIVE DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
The Data Legislation Committee devoted one chapter of their
report to "active dissemination of information." The discussion concerns the possible ways to complement the right of access to official
documents with information systems that serve particular needs.
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EDP technology would play an important part in such information
systems. Their purpose would be to serve as bases for public debate, political programs, research, educational efforts, and activities
of interest organizations. Areas of interest to which the committee
devotes particular attention are statistical data bases and legal data
bases. It would probably be desirable to create specialized information centers that coordinate activities and develop contacts with different groups of "information consumers." Teledoc systems can
probably play an important role in such activities. They offer,
among other things, selective dissemination of information to particular interest groups and communication between interest groups as
well as between such groups and the authorities. They can provide
early information about plans, decisions, investigations, and other
activities of the authorities. Teledoc systems may even constitute
subsystems of teledata systems, computer utility systems with
widespread participation and a broad spectrum of data and activities. This is still at least one or two decades away.
The Committee does not make specific proposals for the creation of active information systems. It discusses possibilities, aims,
difficulties, and strategies, and concludes that the development of
such systems should occur independently of the right of access.
The discussion concludes with a proposal for a broader study in
which groups such as political parties, trade unions, the mass media,
the scientific and educational community, and private business
should be involved.
IX.

STRUCTURING TELEDOC SYSTEMS TO SUPPORT THE
RIGHT OF ACCESS
A.

SOME AXIOMS

Teledoc systems will continue to grow in number. The FOA's
application for an indefinite license has been granted (March 10,
1981), signaling an open door policy on the part of the Data Inspection Board. Other public authorities and, of course, private organizations will organize similar systems. Within the next five to ten
years there will be a growth of teledoc networks in which many
types of institutions and organs will participate. As the KOM system now demonstrates, teledoc networks will be used for such diverse purposes as administrative work, journaling of matters,
decision-making, private communication of messages, preparation of
decisions, and inquiries. The trend will be toward integration with
other types of systems, and the teledoc facility will be increasingly
viewed as one of many closely interrelated functions of data networks. From computerized terminals people will be able to solve
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whole series of tasks with the aid of such interrelated functions that
include, for example, the retrieval of information from libraries, the
maintenance of administrative files, the use of automated controls
and checklists, the filling out of forms, the editing and printing of
texts, and selective dissemination of information. Thus, in the future the teledoc function will be a natural part of computer networks for legislation, jurisdiction, and public administration.
The software used for teledoc systems will probably become
even more flexible and versatile than it is now. There are many
dimensions for continued improvements: user friendliness, retrieval
facilities, routing and linking of messages, interfaces with other
functions, to name but a few.
There is little doubt that today's problems of administrative
openness will change quite radically. The present mixture of manual, computer-assisted, and automated routines leave much room for
a new mixture. The discussion will now turn to the consequences
for the rules on the right of access. The focus will be on teledoc systems; however, many conclusions and viewpoints will concern applications of EDP in general.
B.

NARRow AND BROAD ISSUES

A number of loosely interrelated detailed problems as well as

general structural problems, caused by EDP and, in particular, by
teledoc systems can be found to exist. There is the question of
whether those who seek information should have a right to use ter-

minals. There are questions of the meaning of concepts such as

"routine measures" and "information from a recording." A final
problem concerns the point in time from which to count time limits
for secrecy for "generated" recordings. Problems like this are important, but there are many reasons to devote attention to broader
structural issues first. A better understanding of these issues is required in order to design rules that are well-suited to teledoc systems and other applications of EDP. Existing particular problems
may best be solved by a thorough revision of the present rules on
the right of access.
C.

Focus

ON THE DESIGN OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS

It has traditionally been assumed that the principle of openness
can be applied effectively to the procedures and routines for administration, decision-making, consulting, and handling of matters
which each authority develops. In other words, it is taken for
granted that relevant information is generated and preserved in the
form of documents that interested parties can find. The rules on the
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right of access provide only minimal guarantees that the authorities
will organize their information collections and their procedures for
handling information in ways which further a policy of openness. It
is assumed that the self-interests of the authorities and their decisions on how paperwork should be organized are, at least, consistent
with the purposes of the right of access.
Among the consequences, the following two deserve particular
attention. One, facilities for requesters to survey, retrieve, combine,
identify, and locate information receive little, if any, attention. A requester may decide which official documents he wishes to inspect,
but the rules on the right of access provide no advice on making this
decision. The right of access is presently a "passive" instrument for
obtaining information. Its orientation is "ex post," not "ex ante."
Requested documents should be made available-that is the core
obligation of the authorities. Two, the main rule for deciding which
units of information constitute official documents and their possible
withholding under particular secrecy provisions, is that action is
taken when requests are received. This is reflected, for example, in
section 14:9 of the Secrecy Act, which states that an authority may
impose restrictions or conditions to prevent damage when information is made available to a requester. Furthermore, notices of secrecy on documents are not final and binding but should be reexamined and re-evaluated each time a document is requested.
In many respects, EDP systems, computerized and computer-assisted procedures for decision-making and handling of data, are
characterized by structuring in advance. The activities that rely on
EDP must be understood as fully as possible in terms of information
needs, information habits, information structures, types of decisions,
rules of procedure, and frequency of cases. There is a shift from reliance on discretionary decisions in individual cases to analysis and
description in advance of rules for decision-making. This challenges
the traditional nature of the rules on the right of access. Perhaps
the emphasis should be placed on the authorities' design of the information systems rather than on the concepts of "document" and
"recording" in isolation. The Data Legislation Committee has partially observed this need, as is reflected, for example, in the provisions dealing with description and documentation of EDP systems.
These provisions, however, do not require the authorities to develop
particular types of solutions. In this respect, the requirements in
the DLC proposal are vague, and their practical implications are
uncertain.
If the rules on the right of access remain as they are, then a
number of negative consequences will probably become increasingly apparent. To begin with, the greater flexibility of EDP systems
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with regard to methods for posing questions and retrieving data will
not be fully exploited to the benefit of the information seekers. Using terminals without the assistance and control of an intermediary
represents a serious weakness. Efforts to increase the effectiveness
of the rules on the right of access are hampered by their present orientation. Secondly, there is now a tendency to rely on paper documents and manual routines. For instance, recordings that have
been used in preparing a matter should be printed out and kept in
that form. This rule is probably practical, but it must remain consistent with the rules on the keeping of data in machine-readable form.
Furthermore, the rules regarding journals of matters and similar
lists are presently aimed at "paper-based" manual routines. Should
they not be complemented and extended to exploit the power of automated data processing systems in order to organize data and keep
track of measures and activities? If each authority is left to deal
with the problems of access to data stored in computer systems
when requests are made, access will probably often be denied simply because it would presuppose expensive improvisations.
Finally, the negative consequences of uncertainty should be
mentioned. Uncertainty regarding the application of the rules on
the right of access to EDP systems and regarding the nature and
status of recordings in such systems will tend to conceal such
knowledge from the general public. It is far easier to deny access on
the ground that there are risks of, for example, violations of secrecy
requirements than to try to eliminate such risks in an ad hoc fashion when requests are made. Simplified reasoning of the kind applied in the KOM 79 case (i.e., storage of a recording in a teledoc
system signifies that the recording has been "made ready"), however, may discourage the authorities from using teledoc systems.
Thus, a valuable tool for administrative and judicial activities may
not be utilized as fully as it should be. Although they are not as
practical, the desk drawer, notes on paper, and telephone calls may
appear "safer."
The rules on the right of access should be oriented toward the
design of EDP systems. Although precise and detailed solutions
shall not be developed, the implications and issues shall be
discussed.
D.

NETWORK STRUCTURE

Several issues concern the structure of computer networks with
respect to participants, possibilities of access, and consequences of
the sharing of information resources. One result of the growth of
computer networks, public as well as private, is that the notion of
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"theoretical availability of recordings" will be of greater interest.
Technically, data can be accessed from the terminals of a particular
authority in selections and combinations that do not interest the authority. This leads to a need for planning and investigation in advance, taking into account such problems as the safeguarding of
secrecy between authorities and the "transfer" of secrecy when recordings and fies are made available by one authority to another.
To what extent should the public be required to request information from the authority or the authorities that are responsible for
a certain data base when a request could just as easily be addressed
to another authority that has access to the same data base? How
should responsibilities for the implementation of the right of access
be distributed when several authorities are involved in the building
up and maintenance of data bases? What is needed to design different retrieval procedures for different participants in a network from
the point of view of the right of access? In this context, the concept
of an "authority" may cause difficulties. More precisely, it may be
uncertain whether to treat an organization as one or more separate
authorities. In a teledoc network such difficulties are more likely to
arise and require additional needs for structuring and planning.
Finally, when does the right of access motivate private network
participants to attach terminals or to obtain access to official data
bases by "dial up" procedures? The relationships between private
and public sectors of future computer networks will require new
ways of thinking. For one thing, authorities may be required to
promise secrecy when they are allowed to access private data banks.
Today such promises are exceptional, and their legal consequences
are uncertain.

E.

DATA STRUCTURE

There is a need to plan teledoc systems and other types of EDP
systems so that those who use the systems can do so for different
purposes and know the effects of their actions on data elements and

files. Methods should be established for giving messages the status
of memoranda, drafts, messages for purposes of consultation, pri-

vate messages, etc. Methods should also be established for signaling that recordings have been "made ready." Library fles, which

are not open to the public, should be established and labeled as
such, as should fies used for archive purposes. It may be valuable
to establish special standards for archive fies sice, in practice, it
has proved very difficult for the central archive authorities to handle
the many different forms and types of files that are now created by

various authorities.
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Of particular interest are the information structures that are directly intended to aid the public in locating and retrieving information. Here it may be of value to introduce a concept of "support
files," such as indexes of various kinds, logs of users and activities,
files used for selective dissemination of information concerning
ongoing activities (notification files) and other types of files and procedures. Vague requirements to document activities must be replaced by detailed rules that can be implemented in the form of
computer programs.
The general issue also exists of which collections of data should
constitute "search units," i.e., units which may be gathered from terminals by the information seekers. In manual systems it is clear, for
example, that a journal of matters consisting of a cover and sheets
of paper is to be considered as one single document that should be
made available for inspection. As section 2:7 of the FPA indicates,
there are also other types of lists, journals, and fies which should be
treated in the same manner. Clear rules are needed for EDP systems. A special concept of a "search unit," designed specifically for
EDP systems would probably aid efficiency.
The various aspects of the design of computer systems that
have now been discussed indicate a general need for standardization aimed at implementing the rules and the goals of the right of
access. Efforts in this direction will probably also draw attention to
the problem of different levels of openness and preparedness to
serve the general public. It is more urgent for some types of systems and activities than for others to safeguard the right of access.
Standards, as well as costs, will be higher in urgent cases than in
cases when access is not as urgent. The choices and decisions are
sensitive. Although they have existed in manual systems, they have
tended not to be discussed. The task of designing EDP systems
brings issues to the surface and creates opportunities for analyses
of various problems which, in manual systems, have tended to be
hidden. It may also be noted that the dividing line between the
"classical" right of access and the area of "active dissemination of
information," which the Data Legislation Committee has devoted attention to, is not at all clear. It is largely a matter of taste and policies whether particular measures are regarded within the area of
the right of access or within the area of information services provided by the authorities.
F. SECRECY
A third topic to which attention should be devoted concerns secrecy requirements. These are usually expressed as combinations
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of some or all of the following four elements: type of fact (information), type of matter, type of activity, and type of authority. A secrecy requirement is rarely absolute. The most common situation is
a conditional secrecy in which the presumption may be either for
openness or for secrecy. The test focuses upon the damage that
may possibly result by divulging information. In many situations,
consent of the individual concerned may authorize the handing out
of information. The protection afforded by the Secrecy Act is diverse and concerns the interests of the state, the interests of private
enterprises, and the interests of individuals. This last category of
protected interests in particular causes difficulties with regard to the
need to examine the circumstances of each individual case.
The present rules on secrecy place emphasis on the point in
time when information is requested, rather than on earlier occasions
such as at the creation of a document or the inclusion of a recording
in a particular file. Notices of secrecy can be used but are of a provisional nature ("warning signals"). Decisions regarding withholding
of documents are made when documents are requested. Secret
parts of documents should be excluded and restrictive conditions
may be imposed when documents are made available. It is doubtful
whether there is any room at all for planning and decision-making
in advance concerning the "secrecy structure" of teledoc networks.
An assessment of obligations of secrecy at the stage of EDP systems design involves obvious difficulties. The task is, however, not
impossible, nor is the need for advance evaluation completely unknown at present. Quite often only a rough estimate of the risk of
damage associated with the handing out of documents is possible. It
is the "typical" risk which is decisive. 79 This applies both to situations in which requests for information are received and to situations in which problems of secrecy are dealt with in connection with
the registration of documents. 80 Consequently, support already exists for the notion of evaluation in advance of obligations. Of course,
the practice of using notices of secrecy also illustrates this point.
According to a decision of the Parliamentary Ombudsmen, such notices should state not only the applicable provision in the Secrecy
Act, but also the parts of the document that the obligation refers
to.81 A general principle with similar effects states that the authorities should iry to avoid treating secret and nonsecret circumstances
79. See, e.g., Judgments of the Supreme Administrative Court concerning the
risks associated with making information about foreigners available, RRK 1974 R74
2:26; RRK 1975 R75 2:33.
80. H. STR5MBERG, supra note 21, at 31-32; Government Bill 79/80:2, A, at 357.
81. JO (The Parliamentary Ombudsmen) 1971 report at 333.
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in the same document.8 2
Decisions of a schematic nature regarding obligations of secrecy
are practiced and, to some extent, accepted today. These practices
need further development and detailing for application to teledoc
systems. These difficulties are large, but not insurmountable. For
many categories of data and retrieval procedures, it is possible to
clarify in advance the risks from the point of view of the Secrecy Act
and how these risks can be dealt with to allow the broadest possible
access.
It is beyond the scope of this article to explore the detailed consequences of measures involving "secrecy design" for various types
of information retrieval, text processing, and data base management
systems; however, three key notions exist: secret, sensitive, and innocent (or open) information. The second and third categories toSensitive
gether are more extensive than the first category.
information may be described as information that should potentially
be kept secret and for which it is not possible to promulgate rules in
advance which specify the form, context, and uses. The information
may be made available without violating the rules in the Secrecy
Act. The relative sizes of the second and the third categories are not
fixed but are to some extent an outcome of a subjective choice.
Thus, improved design tools for the improvement of teledoc systems
and the ambition and preparedness to accept costs are of obvious
significance. The decisions and design tasks will be of varying complexity, concerning data elements and aggregates of data. They will,
of course, also concern many procedural elements, including
programmed restrictions, monitoring and alert functions, and procedures for de-identification and encryption.
The three design elements which have been discussed, network
structure, data structure, and secrecy requirements, form an integrated whole. The purposes of these three elements are (1) to clarify for the information holders, as well as for the information
seekers, the nature of the systems from the right of access point of
view; (2) to diminish the risk that lack of planning weakens the
right of access as far as teledoc and other EDP systems are concerned; (3) to improve the possibilities of finding and bringing together information that is considered relevant and important by the
information seekers and, in particular, to enable the information
seekers themselves to use the computer as a tool for such purposes;
and (4) to strengthen the right of access and open new dimensions
for it with the aid of computer technology.
82. S. RymAN & E.

HOLMBERG, OFFENTLIGHETSPRINCIPEN OCH MYNDIGHETERNA

(Lund. H. Ohlsson 1980).
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CONCLUSION

The preceding discussion emphasizes the need to shift attention
from the application of the rules on the right of access to documents
in individual cases to the design of whole information systems.
Such a shift would probably benefit both manual and computerized
data processing systems. Planning and structuring in advance are
the key words. They mark the need for new control and enforcement mechanisms. Thus, the creation of a new function at each authority has been proposed, the "right of access supervisor."83 One
important task of these supervisors would be to assure that EDP
systems are designed and used with due concern for the right of access. The supervisors would also be engaged in the organization of
educational and advisory activities at the authorities. At a higher
level, the responsibilities of the Data Inspection Board should be
broadened, rather than restricted, to matters of protection of personal privacy. Assessment of the right of access to teledoc and
other EDP systems can be viewed as one additional task of the
Board.
The future of the rules on the right of access under Swedish law
is uncertain. Undoubtedly, to some observers, the present rules
probably seem both sufficient and satisfactory. The fact that the
concepts and solutions have a long legal history does not create a
favorable climate for radical restructuring. It is also uncertain
whether the country is politically ready to accept the costs and troubles associated with a more active and efficient right of access.
I personally believe a revision is urgent. The proposals of the
Data Legislation Committee should serve only as starting points and
should not limit future proposals which may be made. The overall
goal should be to create a regulation that is more detailed than the
present one and that takes into consideration the characteristics of
teledoc systems and other applications of EDP. I believe that this
effort is necessary to maintain the principle of openness in an increasingly automated environment for administrative and judicial
activities.

83. Working Party for EDP and Law (Stockholm University): Statements Concerning the Proposal of the Data Legislation Committee (ADBJ PM 1981:1).

